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ADMIRALS, INFORMATION OFFICERS, AND THE NEWS MEDIA

BY

ROBERT B. SIMS

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS
(Journalism)

at the
UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

1971

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MARKOVIC, CHARACTERIZATION OF[illegible] AND THE HOME MARKET

BY

ROBERT D. DUNN

A thesis submitted to Harvard University in partial fulfillment of the

requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

(Economics)

HARVARD COLLEGE

1971

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This study would not have been completed had it not been for the help and cooperation of a number of individuals. This is my chance to name them.

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Finally, there is that helter skelter family of

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First, the thesis committee and professional observation, Professors Steven Crabtree and Janet Cowing have offered my gratitude and profound respect.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This is a study designed to compare the attitudes of top management in the Navy's officer corps with the attitudes of the Navy's uniformed public information officers. The attitudes compared are those relating to the news media of mass communications. A principal purpose of the study is to find out whether or not there is an internal "communications gap" within the Navy between these two groups, and to assess the implications of the findings for Navy public relations.

Although this is problem-oriented applied research, it has larger dimensions. Professional public relations is a twentieth century phenomenon that came into being when owners and managers of large business enterprises found it necessary to defend themselves from a variety of attacks in the public arena. Most of the attacks involved accusations that they were not serving the public interest. The villains of the plot, from the management point of view, were most often representatives of the news media. Early public relations people were usually men who had media experience. They could be counted on to use their friendly

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

relations with the press to enhance the reputation of the client. A three-way relationship developed, with management pursuing its goals, newsmen probing in accordance with their values, and public relations personnel trying to mediate and, in some cases, to manipulate. Progressive development of public relations philosophy has convinced many practitioners that the usefulness of an organization and its performance should be the bases for public attitudes toward the organization, and that the public relations function is socially justified when it ethically and effectively pleads the cause of a client or organization in the forum of public debate. Public awareness of the usefulness and the performance of an organization comes through communication, and public relations practitioners can facilitate that communication. Some practitioners also feel that by stressing the need for public approval, they may actually improve the conduct of the organizations they serve.

As organizations have grown in size, the three-way relationship between management, public relations staff, and the news media has become institutionalized. Public relations staffs have become fixtures in most large organizations of American society, including government organizations. Mass society, mass democracy, mass organizations and mass media produced the mass mediator. Cutlip and Center (1964) point out that the public

relations specialist, whether in government, business, or some other area, is still the "man in the middle" in press relations. "To be effective in his role as a go-between," they say, "the practitioner must have the full confidence of his organization and of the press. This is not easy. Their interests often conflict." (p. 303) This conflict of interests may become an internal organizational problem, with management viewing the public relations staff as an advocate for the "other side," and public relations people seeing management as unreasonably rigid in its policies. A key factor in this situation is the nature of the perceptions held by management of the attitudes of the public relations staff, and vice versa. If the public relations people are viewed as being overly favorable to the news media, for example, they are not likely to have the full confidence of management. If management is seen as being extremely hostile to the news media, public relations staff members may repress policy recommendations that appear to favor the media.

This three-way relationship becomes particularly evident in military services, where hierarchical structures of authority make the attitudes of seniors extremely important and at the same time inhibit the flow of internal communications on which attitudes are based, justified or altered. It is not necessarily true that communication in a large organization is "down the line" all the time. In

fact, the reverse is more likely. A great deal of face-to-face communication in military settings consists of juniors briefing seniors on their programs and advocating their goals. What is important is that decisions are "from the top down" and what staff members think the boss will decide often takes the place of a verbalized decision. Programs and goals may be tailored to the perceptions staff officers have of what management will approve.

Perceived attitudes, then, are a critical factor in the functioning of any large organization. In military public relations matters, especially, perceptions may be inaccurate due to a tendency toward a minimum of discussion and a maximum of presumption.

For this study, we take a particular bureaucracy and try to find out whether or not there is an internal "communications gap" between top management and public relations staff. As a special case, the Navy can be contrasted with other bureaucracies, including other military organizations. Here we have an extremely large organization with a hierarchical rank structure and a great deal of organizational tradition and folklore. Within the organization we can isolate two groups and call them top management and public relations staff. The Navy's flag officers--in peacetime, its Admirals, Vice Admirals and

Rear Admirals[1]--can be considered representative of top management. This group is certainly not the totality of top management in the organization, since "command" is a Navy concept that applies equally to the Lieutenant Commander or Lieutenant who is skipper of a minesweeper, the Captain who is in charge of an aircraft carrier, and the Vice Admiral who has a fleet at his direction. The flag officer group, however, can be considered those at the pinnacle of management. The Navy's public affairs specialists[2] represent its public relations staff. These officers are designated as specialists by the Navy. They move from one public information assignment to another, working as technical experts whether in the Pentagon, at sea on the staff of a fleet commander, or in a naval district headquarters in the Midwest. They have no commands, and their specialty has had no flag officers since it was created by the Navy at the close of World War II. They are not the

---

[1]"Flag officer" refers to any office above the grade of captain. The Navy has a one star wartime rank, commodore, below rear admiral and above captain, that corresponds to brigadier general in the Army. Fleet admiral, a permanent five star rank, was last authorized in World War II.

[2]The military term currently used for officers who work in this area is "public affairs officer." The title "public relations officer" is not used by the military. Throughout this study the terms public affairs specialist, PAO, information officer, and public relations officer are interchangeable.

the only or the class of which it is one. They are not the

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[4] "Flying officer" refers to any office above the grade of captain. The Army has a one star rating, commodore, below rear admiral and above captain, that corresponds to brigadier general in the Army. Flown admiral, a paramount five star rank, was last occupied by Nimitz and Halsey.

[5] The military has commonly used the phrase who went in this area is "public affairs officer." The title "public relations officer" is not used by the military. Throughout this study the terms public information officer, information officer, and public relations officer are interchangeable.

totality of Navy public relations, since there are non-specialists in public affairs assignments and since the Navy has traditionally adhered to the enigmatic philosophy that public relations is a "responsibility of command" and at the same time an "all hands job." Yet the specialists are unquestionably the technocrats of public relations within the Navy's bureaucracy.

This degree of specialization for public affairs officers, the relative ease in identifying a top management group, and the Navy's reputation as the "silent service" in its relations with the news media make it a particularly appropriate subject for this study. Like other military services, the Navy is a prototype of the large bureaucratic organization. A study of its top management and public relations staff and their attitudes toward the news media should offer some findings that may be generalizable to other organizational settings.

With this in mind, there are questions to be asked about the attitudes of the two groups typified by these Navy officers. These should be raised:

What attitudes do top managers in this large organization hold toward the news media?

Are these attitudes similar to those held by the organization's public relations staff members?

Does each of these groups have an accurate perception of the attitudes held by the other?

tion of the activities held by the organi-

Have each of these groups have an honorary fraternity's faculty relations board (or

Are these activities ethical or those held by the

Should sanctions be imposed on those who violate ethical standards? Please explain.

Each role is vital, since the decisions to be made about the activities of the two groups highlighted by these

cases involve ethical questions. Please answer the questions as they relate to your

personal ethical standards and to the ethical standards of the fraternity as a whole.

What are the implications for the organization, of these attitudes and perceptions?

Are there general implications for mass communication research, for other organizations, for the news media, or for the study and practice of public relations?

One factor enhanced this study but could have affected it negatively. The researcher is a Navy public affairs specialist, and he has worked with flag officers for the past twelve years. This provided a professional interest in the research project. It also enabled the researcher to obtain cooperation for the study, something social scientists often find difficult. It required, however, that the study be carefully designed to control for personal biases that might otherwise intrude.

The design for the study was strongly influenced by the coorientational approach outlined by Chaffee and McLeod (1968; Chaffee, McLeod and Guerrero, 1969). They suggest that since almost any definition of communication involves at least two persons, it seems reasonable to make an effort to observe and theorize about interpersonal coorientation, rather than to study intrapersonal orientation and assume that communication was "somehow" involved. Their approach includes an explicit model. The coorientational model assumes that a person cooriented with another person has at least two distinguishable sets of cognitions. Each knows

what he thinks, and he has some estimate of what other person(s) think. By using a set of empirical measures, we can apply this model to find out what Admirals think about the news media, what information officers think about the news media, and what each of these aggregates "thinks the other group thinks." That is precisely what this study has attempted to do, by using a set of statements that are either generally favorable or generally unfavorable to the news media, and asking individuals whether they tend to agree or disagree with the statements--and then asking them how they think the other group would respond to the same statements. The study produced data about the information sources of the respondents and other descriptive material, but the focus of the work has narrowed to these questions:

What are the attitudes held by flag officers toward a set of statements that are generally favorable or unfavorable to the news media?

What are the attitudes held by information specialists toward the same set of statements?

How much agreement is there between these two groups?

How accurate is each group at estimating the attitudes of the other?

How much congruency is perceived? (i.e., To what extent does each think the other's attitudes resemble its own attitudes?)

This empirical framework allows us to use precise measures to compare group attitudes toward the media. Based on this comparison, we can venture a partial analysis of the relationship between top management and public relations staff in the Navy and assess the specific and general implications of the findings.

CHAPTER II

BACKGROUND AND THEORY

This chapter discusses the major variables of the study and introduces the hypotheses that are to be tested. It reviews literature about the study of large organizations and shows how the roles of flag officer and information officer are formalized in the Navy. "Attitude toward the news media" is defined. Historical relationships between the military and the news media are examined. The coorientational approach is described and the variables of the coorientation model are defined. Research findings and other reasons leading to the general hypotheses are reviewed.

Organizational Studies

Institutions of business, government, education, labor, communications, etc., have developed hierarchical administrative and operative social machinery. Systematic investigation of the patterns of interaction and interpersonal relations by Blau and his associates (1956, 1963, 1967) developed organizational theory as a conceptual framework for the study of society. Blau (1956) notes that bureaucracy provides a natural laboratory for research.

Chapter 13

Background for Inquiry

While chapter discusses the major viewpoints of the study and introduces the hypotheses that are to be tested. It includes discussion about the value of life satisfaction and interpersonal relationships. Terminology is defined. Historical relationship between the variables is explored. Assumptions underlying the conceptual approach is described and the variables of the investigation model are defined. Limitations and other pertinent material to the research hypotheses are explored.

Historical Setting

Industrialization of nations, government, education, trade, communications, etc., have developed bureaucratic and hierarchic societies. Investigation of the patterns of interaction and influence between persons in organizations by Max Weber (1925, 1924, 1921) developed ideal-typical theory of a complex framework for the study of society. Simon (1976) notes that bureaucracy pervades a natural inherent one viewpoint.

The formal organization, with its explicit regulations and official positions, constitutes "controlled" conditions. These controls have not been artificially introduced by the scientist but are an inherent part of the bureaucratic structure. Blau admits that the daily activities and interactions of the members of a bureaucracy cannot be entirely accounted for by the official blueprint. One prime example of "bureaucracy's other face" cited by Blau is the Navy, where informal relations, not officially recognized, play a part in producing efficient solutions that are not possible within the framework of the official institutional structure. As a result, he concedes that bureaucracies are not such rigid structures as is popularly assumed, and that informal interactions are examples of bureaucracy in the process of change. "Nevertheless, the explicitly formal organization, the characteristics of which can be easily ascertained, reduces the number of variable conditions in the bureaucratic situation and thereby facilitates the search for and the testing of explanatory hypotheses." (p. 25)

Flag Officer and Information Officer Roles in the Navy

A key to understanding a bureaucracy is knowledge about the social roles within it. Flag officers and information officers in the Navy can be thought of as having specific roles, with certain role expectations.

The latest redistribution, with its complicated compromises and
internal pressures, constitutes "bargaining" accordingly.
These constants have not been artificially introduced by the
economist but are an inherent part of the institutional
structure. Also added must be daily activities and
interactions of the members of a bureaucracy caused by
unlikely occurrences for by the official blueprint. One
prime example of "bureaucracy's other face" cited by Kim
is the navy, whose informal relations, not officially
recognized, play a part in rewarding efficient activities
that are not possible within the framework of the official
institutional structure. In a recent, he concedes that
bureaucracies are not such rigid structures as to possibly
succeed, and that informal interactions are complex at
bureaucracy in the process of change. "Activities, the
explicitly formal organization, the objectivities of
value can be easily measurized, reduced the number of
variable conditions in the bureaucratic structure and
thereby facilitates the search for and the tracing of
significant patterns." (p. 49)

Play Culture and Indoctrination
Culture Roles in the Army

A key to understanding a bureaucracy is knowledge
about the social roles within it. Play cultures and
indoctrination cultures in the Army can be thought of as
having specific roles, with certain role expectations.

Allen and Sarbin (in Lindzey, 1968) describe role as a metaphoric term borrowed directly from the theater, intended to denote that conduct adheres to certain "parts" (or positions) rather than to the players who read or recite them:

> The conceptual bridge between social structure and role behavior is the concept of role expectations. This is a cognitive concept, the content of which consists of beliefs, expectancies, subjective probabilities, and so on. The units of social structure are positions or statuses (in specialized contexts, jobs and offices). These units are defined in terms of actions and qualities expected of the person who at any time occupies the position. For example, the person who occupies the position of college president is expected to engage in certain actions and not in others. (p. 497)

Navy flag officers, too, are expected to engage in certain activities and not in others. They constitute the recognized leadership of the Navy, and they are assigned to specific jobs calling for skill, experience and motivation they are expected to possess. They even have certain expectations in relations with the news media and the public that are different from other naval officers. Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Chief of Naval Operations, told a group of newly appointed flag officers in 1969:

> By assuming the rank of Rear Admiral, two very interesting changes will most probably affect you insofar as your relations with the public are concerned. First, you will gain a great deal more visibility, and secondly, you'll find your role as an authority on naval matters will increase. As a Rear Admiral, you will stand out more in the crowd. Enlisted men, and some junior officers, will give you more maneuvering room. But you'll also discover that the public will afford you more attention. In some

> The conceptual bridge between abstract structure and role behavior is the concept of [illegible] role.
> This is a completely personal, [illegible] concrete [illegible] and [illegible]. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

> situations, you'll make friends more easily than you thought possible, and doors previously reluctant to open will swing wide and welcome for you. Your presence on the rostrum will be more in demand, and important civilians will want to include you in their social and community activities. All of this is important and desirable, because you are a member of the Navy's executive management team. I'm sure you will adjust to this increased visibility and I hope you will enjoy it. There are other ramifications to this visibility, however. . . . Suppose a major accident occurs and it involves personnel and equipment in your command. . . . A rumor is spreading in the community adjacent to your shore command which alleges the accident could well have posed a threat to the safety of your civilian neighbors. Once again, you could not be more visible if you tried, as far as the community's leaders are concerned. As the man-in-charge, it's up to you to present the facts, clarify the false information, and quickly dispatch the rumor. Ostrich-like behavior in such cases, is unacceptable. You're the flag officer, the ball is yours, and you are expected to run with it. (Text of remarks at the Senior Executive Management Course, U. S. Naval War College, Newport, R. I., August 8, 1969.)

If the flag officer is expected to run with the ball in such cases, it is the public affairs officer's role to block for him. Information officers are specialists within the Navy's officer corps. Their expertise is in dealing with the Navy's publics, including the news media. Although they are expected to have motivations similar to other naval officers, they are expected to possess skills in the public relations area. Their role also calls for them to be staff men, not policy-makers. Lang (in Janowitz, 1964) provides this analysis:

> The distinction between line officer and specialist is most explicit in the Navy. The Navy's promotion system is geared to the advancement of unrestricted line officers, the only ones qualified to command at sea. Categories outside the unrestricted line,

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

> consisting of engineering duty officers, aeronautical engineering duty officers and special duty officers in such fields as communications, intelligence . . . and public information are clearly recognized. Staff corps officers, a third category, are commissioned in or assigned to the Chaplain's Corps, the Civil Engineer's Corps, the Supply Corps, and the various medical service corps. The advancement of officers not in the unrestricted line is linked to the advancement of those qualified for seagoing command by a "running mate" principle, which preserves the integrity of the rank structure but prescribes distinct career lines. (p. 75)

Role theorists devote much attention to conflicts in which the individual finds himself the occupant of two positions with conflicting role expectations. Burchard (1954) used empirical data to show that the position of a military chaplain leads to a role conflict. He serves in both military and religious hierarchies. According to Burchard, the chaplain seeks to reconcile this conflict either through "rationalization" or through "compartmentalization" of role behaviors; rationalization of conflict in roles tends to strengthen the chaplain's role of military officer at the expense of his role of minister of the gospel. Burchard's study dealt with the extreme case of individuals serving in two value-oriented hierarchical organizations, religious and military. No such conflict exists for flag officers or information officers. There may be role conflicts for officers who see themselves as having expectations other than those prescribed for their official positions in the Navy, but it seems reasonable in this study to regard each group as having quite precise

role expectations, formalized by the organization.

Attitude toward the News Media

Organizational roles may have a strong relationship to attitudes held by individuals in the military toward the news media. Before discussing the relationship between military organizations and the news media, however, we should define the variable "attitude toward the news media."

Attitude studies are plentiful in the social sciences, and definitions of attitude are also commonplace. Insko (1967, p. 2) provides a useful summary of much of the theoretical work in this area. These are examples of definitions he lists:

"An attitude is a mental and neural state of readiness, organized through experience, exerting a directive or dynamic influence upon the individual's response to all objects and situations with which it is related." (Allport, 1935)

"Attitude is primarily a way of being 'set' toward or against certain things." (Murphy, Murphy and Newcomb, 1937)

An attitude is a "relatively stable affective response to an object." (Rosenberg, 1956)

An attitude is a "tendency or disposition to evaluate an object or the symbol of that object in a certain

role expectations, reenforced by peer relationships.

Initiating Change in Peer Media

Organizational roles may have a strong relationship to exclusive help by individuals in the military toward new media. Despite discussion of relationship between military experimentation and the "media change," we should define the variable "attitude toward the news media."

Attitude research was pioneered in the social sciences, and definitions of attitude vary somewhat. Thurstone (1967, p. 3) provides a useful summary of much of the concept's work in this area. Those who consider attitude definitions to include:

"an affect for or against some psychological object, including social institutions, propositions or slogans, interpersonal behavior, or aesthetic objects. It is inferred from verbal responses to all objects and situations which occur in the universe." (Kiesler, 1969)

"Attitude is primarily a way of being 'set' toward or against certain things." (Hochman, Insko and Brandon, 1967)

"An attitude is a 'relatively enduring organization of beliefs around an object.'" (Rosenberg, 1960)

"An attitude is a 'tendency or disposition to evaluate an object or its symbol or class objects in a certain

way." (Katz and Stotland, 1959)

Insko concluded that for most contemporary theorists the concept of attitude specifically implies affect or feeling of pro or con, favorability or unfavorability with regard to a particular object or entity. It seems that the disputes over the exact locus or nature of this affective bond have receded, in comparison with a strong concurrence among researchers that "something" affective is certainly "there"--and is roughly measurable.

This "affect or feeling" is usually observed empirically by the use of verbal behavior measures, such as self-reported questionnaire items. This approach is often taken in behavioral science research to produce data representing mental attitudes, and to demonstrate the direction and intensity of attitudes.

In the framework that will guide this research, "news media" refers specifically to the channels of mass communications that are generally recognized as the primary carriers of timely formal news content and comment, namely, television, radio, newspapers, and periodicals. Motion pictures and books are excluded from this definition.

As defined for this study, then, attitude toward the news media is an individual's mental affective position, as reflected by his verbal self-description, with regard to formal channels of news communication, people associated with those channels, and content of the channels.

Attitude toward the news media is, therefore, an evaluation. The attitude may be related to actual behavior, but it should be recognized that behavioral effects beyond the measured verbal behavior may not necessarily result from an attitude, even a strongly held one (Festinger, 1964).

Military Attitudes toward the News Media

The military-media relationship is most often studied or discussed from the point of view of the news media. When military attitudes toward the media are commented on, military services and military officers are often pictured as holding hostile attitudes toward the media. One general theme is that military organizations, through elaborate information machinery, generate public attitudes favorable to self-serving military policies, while opposing any open discussion of substantial military questions. Mills (1956) viewed military leaders as part of a "power elite" utilizing extensive communications and public relations techniques to achieve unworthy goals. Wiggins (1964), a media spokesman, saw an intense conflict between freedom of the press and military security policy.

Rosten (1937) failed to discover a single Washington correspondent who concentrated on the military departments in peacetime. Slightly more than two decades later, Underwood (1960) found that there was a Pentagon

Politics Beyond the Iron Curtain: Theodicy, or
evaluation. The criteria may be derived to account for
the measured actual behavior but not necessarily behavior
for it should be accompanied some judgement effects between
ities on politics, even a minority party can.(Beetham,
1964).

Military Participation Ideology
The Iron Curtain

The military-media effectiveness is most often
studied or discussed from the point of view of the mass
media. When military officers command the media for
control or military services and military, military may
often function as hosting hostile activities toward the
media. One general cause is that military cooperations,
through physical (physical) media. Separate hostile
activities connected to multi-party military relations,
while observers may also (association of nonmilitary military
functions. Wolfe (1964) stated military images as part of
a "power elite" military national communities and
hostile relations relations to nations namely party.
Rapoport (1969), a media explanation, was in nations coalition
between freedom of the press and military society hostile.
Journey (1957) refers to dimension a single
multiparty coalitions and communications on the military
regulations to protection. Highly more time can develop
for it should be accompanied some judgement effects between
the measured actual behavior but not necessarily behavior.
evaluation. The criteria may be derived to account for
ities on politics, even a minority party can.(Beetham,
1964).

press corps of specialized reporters which had, with little notice, become an influential group. He interviewed most of the approximately three dozen military writers in Washington and found that many complained about "ingrained cautiousness" on the part of military officials which hindered reporting, as did "failure of officials to trust responsible newsmen." Rivers (1965, p. 24) quotes one Defense Department correspondent as saying, "By and large, the regulars see themselves as a squad of guerrilla fighters in a journalistic army of desk jockeys. They consider their beat to be tougher and more complex than any other, and they rate the department news policies under which they function much more restrictive than those anywhere else in Washington."

Some observers have commented that the basis for much information policy in the military services seems to be one of informing the public about those things considered "good" in terms of generating support for military programs, and avoiding disclosures of "bad" news. In particular, the Navy's reputation as the "silent service" implies that it routinely avoids disclosure of all sorts. Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Phil G. Goulding, an ex-newsman, commented that the Navy "is simply a little withdrawn from the rest of the world and even a little peculiar." (1970, p. 141)

Actually, there are few empirical studies dealing

with government or military attitudes toward the media, and none dealing specifically with Navy flag officer and information officer attitudes.

Janowitz (1960) produced sociological data about professional military officers, and came to an intuitive conclusion that there had been a change in the attitudes held by military officials toward the news media. At one time, he said, military leaders had a long-standing tradition of hostility to the press because of their dislike of contradiction. "They saw journalists as particularly obnoxious sources of public criticisms." (p. 395) But World Wars I and II forced the military men to accept the "public relations principle" to maintain "morale" on the home front.

Huntington (1960) believed that the spur of competition in strategic programs drove the services to great efforts to build up congressional and public support, a conclusion based on his interpretation of events.

Winston, on the other hand, systematically surveyed 100 of the 140 Army generals on duty in Washington, D. C., in 1962 to determine their attitudes toward the press and Army information policies. He found that most of his respondents thought the press was not properly serving the people. They did not trust reporters. In a discussion of his findings, Winston argued that the Army hierarchy needed a more profound comprehension of the ideals of America, and

said that the generals were naive about the democratic process, but not antagonistic toward it. Their loyalty to the government, he felt, made it difficult for them to understand the strange ways of the press which "seems to criticize government most savagely in times of crisis."

Cohen (1963) used extensive interviews with persons in foreign policy decision-making positions to describe their attitudes toward and relationship with the press. He quotes a former State Department official: "From the standpoint of the State Department, the White House, the Pentagon, the press is looked on as a dangerous, unattractive beast, which can lead you along for a little bit of the way, but which is likely to turn and bite you at the slightest opportunity." (p. 168) Cohen's interviews showed patterns of attitudes toward the press among foreign policy makers as being both favorable and unfavorable, characterized by a "love-hate" relationship. On a frequency basis, almost a third more respondents (78) in the Executive and Legislative branches expressed negative attitudes toward the press than made favorable remarks (60). Unfavorable attitudes were often based on a "pervading sense of fear" growing out of the officials' inability to control what the press does with the information it gets. Respondents favorable to the press frequently expressed this in terms of defense of the characteristics and qualities of correspondents themselves, and their helpfulness in the

process of foreign policy-making. Cohen discusses institutional and personality differences in attitude formation. Some persons "naturally" find it easy to deal with the press, while others find it so difficult that they consistently manage to avoid all contact with reporters. The latter quite apparently outnumber the former. Cohen argues against the assumption that top-level officials can talk to reporters with confidence that comes from their positions of authority, while lower-level personnel are more reluctant to put their careers at risk in these encounters. It is easy, he says, to find good relationships and bad relationships at all levels, and the State Department's procedures which restrict the number of authoritative spokesmen tends to make high-level officials cautious, while releasing junior officials who will not be quoted for attribution from their inhibitions with the press. Cohen touches on the key theme of this research:

> It is sometimes argued, for example, that the P-area people--the Public Affairs Advisers, the men in the News Office and the other offices and divisions of the Bureau of Public Affairs--who are professionally concerned with the State Department's public relations, are more likely to be favorably disposed toward the press, while the desk officers--the substantive people, the Foreign Service professionals--have a fundamental antipathy toward the press and other "outside" institutions. There is quite a bit of secondary evidence that supports the main burden of this distinction; most Foreign Service officers are not in direct contact with the press, whether or not their instinct is to avoid it, as one of them asserted. And in the P-area, officials talk freely of their "constant battle" with the desk officers on behalf of "maximum

> disclosure." "We wish to make full information available and appear a little bolder; Foreign Service Officers are cautious. . . ." Here, too, we lack the data properly to evaluate this hypothesis, but we can at least indicate some qualifications that should be considered. . . . In the first place, the distinction itself is not wholly valid, since many persons in the P-area are Foreign Service Officers on normal assignment. . . . Furthermore . . . there is circumstantial evidence that more than just a few desk officers <u>are</u> in contact with the press. . . . The line of distinction that seems most valid here, as elsewhere, is . . . between those people in <u>all</u> classifications and at <u>every</u> level in the Department who are confident in their dealings with the press, and those who are not. (p. 156f)

This distinction is important, but there is reason to believe that it is more applicable to the State Department than to the Defense Department, especially its Navy component. Navy public affairs officers do not rotate to and from other areas. There is reason to believe that they do indeed have more frequent contacts with the media than line officers, and that these contacts are probably more pleasant than those of other officers.

Dunn (1969) examined relationships between newsmen and public officials in Wisconsin state government. He concludes that public officials' views of the press are conditioned most by the extent to which they perceive the press as helping them achieve their goals. "When the press serves his purposes, an official sees it as helpful, believes that it is performing its work well, and is willing to cooperate with it. But when the press acts contrary to his purposes, he sees it as a hindrance,

believes that it is performing its work badly, and is likely to get into conflict with it." (p. 85) Dunn found in interviews with 45 public officials that the total number of favorable evaluatory comments about reporters, papers, editorial writers or the press in general numbered 178, while unfavorable comments numbered 274. Fully 56 per cent of the executive officials, administrators, and legislative leaders he interviewed made more unfavorable than favorable evaluations, 40 per cent made more favorable than unfavorable evaluations, and 4 per cent gave an equal number of favorable and unfavorable evaluations.

In a carefully designed study of the attitudes and perceptions of government (non-military) information officials and newsmen in Washington, Nimmo (1964) found that government information officers have three distinct, although usually overlapping, functions: (1) service to the public, the media, and to the administrator; (2) promotion of the organization as a propagandist, publicist or public relations man; and (3) policy-making, either through personal decision or by exercising popular controls over policy-makers. The first of these functions, that of a facilitator providing service, seemed to predominate in the cases Nimmo studied. "The picture that emerges, therefore, is of the information officer as a servant to the public, organization, and press." (p. 31) He used a framework that compared the attitudes of newsmen toward information

officers with attitudes of information officers toward newsmen, and pointed out other relationships for possible comparison in the same way: the relationship between news-managers (i.e., editors and producers) and reporters, and the relationship between government decision-makers and information officers. This study borrows Nimmo's suggestion for research and applies it to the Navy in a systematic manner by using the coorientational approach.

The Coorientation Model

The coorientation model, as suggested and expanded by Chaffee and McLeod (1967, 1968, 1969), involves in its basic form two persons in orientation toward the same object. The question of its utility for groups of individuals is unresolved, due to problems associated with reification; but it has been used as a framework for question-raising and measurement in studies of professional communicators by Wentz (1968) and by Martin *et al.* (1970). In the context of relationships in a hierarchical organization like the Navy, there is a certain utility, it seems, to knowing the nature of the stereotyped or "reified other" perception held by individuals, since this reification refers to deeply institutionalized roles.

The coorientation model involves three variables. The first is agreement, the extent to which two persons--or in the case of this study, two groups--actually agree in

their orientation toward some object or entity in their psychological environment. The second variable is accuracy, the correctness with which they perceive the others' evaluation of the object or entity. The third is congruency, the extent to which one group thinks the other agrees. Figure 1 shows the coorientational model, as conceptualized for this study.

From the viewpoint of communication theory, this model is significant in that it suggests that effective communication should, at least, increase accuracy. Increased communication may also increase agreement and congruency, but this is not a prediction to be made lightly, since values are personally derived from experience. Communication may bring little or no change to deeply held values.

Chaffee, McLeod and Guerrero (1969) report one experiment, for example, in which coorientational variables were measured before and after discussion. At the beginning of interview sessions, husband-wife pairs were asked about their opinions on a series of current issues, and about what they thought their spouse's opinions would be. Later, after a 15-minute period in which they discussed these current issues, they were asked the same questions. Chaffee and McLeod report that correlations were found between congruency in the first question period and agreement and accuracy in the second, and between agreement in the first



Note: Boxes in this diagram indicate measures that are taken on each group. Arrows connecting boxes indicate the measures that are compared in constructing the component indices.

Fig. 1.--Component Evaluative Indices of the Coorientation Situation: Agreement, Accuracy and Congruency.



and accuracy in the second. These results suggest that accuracy improves with communication, as might be expected. They also suggest that two people who think they agree are more likely to explain their values to one another in a communication situation. In this case, the open communication seemed to foster agreement, too. But perhaps it would not be inappropriate to assume that most of the husband-wife pairs liked each other, or that there was some attraction that might have led to a "strain toward symmetry" of the type Newcomb (1953) discussed. In a larger study, O'Keefe (1970) attempted to determine the effect of communication on the coorientation variables in parent-adolescent pairs. His data, gathered from 1,286 Wisconsin junior and senior high school students and their parents, showed that higher communication was significantly associated with higher coorientation scores concerning the importance of the child's going to college. But the data did not clearly show this relationship for a group of political issue items. Thus, while communication may or may not be important in harmonizing attitudes, it is interesting to speculate about the part it plays under specific conditions. Such speculation is particularly interesting when we are talking about groups that are vitally important to the public relations of a specific large military organization (the Navy) and when the attitudes we are discussing are oriented toward the news media

of mass communications. In this context and in a single study, we touch on many of the basic concerns in present-day study of communications and journalism: interpersonal communications, attitudes, the mass media, government-media relations, and organizational public relations.

One study cannot hope to contribute significantly in all these areas; it seems apparent that the first order of business should be to hypothesize about the relationship of attitudes held by flag officers and by information officers, and to test these hypotheses empirically, using coorientational measures.

General Hypotheses

Using this conceptual framework, the researcher designed a study to measure basic feelings toward the news media held by a representative group of Navy flag officers and a representative group of Navy public affairs officers. Research was directed toward determining the following:

(a) the characteristics of these groups, and the sources of information they utilize;

(b) their attitudes toward the news media;

(c) whether or not they tend to reify the other group, and if so,

(d) the perceptions held by each of the groups of the attitudes of the other group;

(e) the amount of agreement between the attitudes of the

two groups;

(f) the degree of accuracy with which they perceive each others' views; and

(g) the degree of congruency (perceived agreement) of each toward the other.

Hypotheses to be tested and an elaboration of the research and reasoning that leads to each are as follows:

(1) The attitudes of Navy flag officers toward the news media are significantly less favorable than the attitudes of Navy information officers.

A basic finding in social psychology is that people "hold opinions, attitudes and beliefs in harmony with their group memberships and identifications." (Berelson and Steiner, 1964, p. 566) Winston's evidence indicated that Army general officers were hostile to the news media, and intuitive assessments by Janowitz and Huntington lead to similar conclusions. Few Admirals have media experience which would lead them to sympathize with the technical problems associated with news reporting, whereas information officers, often from media backgrounds, work with newsmen regularly. Information officers are likely to have routine satisfactory contacts with media representatives, particularly in light of Nimmo's finding that government information officers view their role as one of facilitating the work of the news media. On the other hand, flag officer contacts with the media, as Admiral Moorer's

two groups:

(1) the degree of honesty with which they perceive each others' views, and

(2) the degree of sensitivity (perceived importance) of each toward the other.

Hypotheses to be tested and an elaboration of the research and reasoning that leads to each are as follows:

(1) The perceptions of Black militants toward the media are significantly less favorable than the attitudes of their information officers.

A basic finding in social psychology is that people "hold opinions, attitudes and beliefs in harmony with their group membership and identifications." (Berelson and Steiner, 1964, p. 540) Whereas militant's evidence inadequate time spanned editors were hostile to the news media, and identify themselves by choosing and describing jobs to similar constituents. The Materials have media experiences which would lead them to sympathize with the militant's problems associated with news reporting. Whereas information officers often face media inaccuracies, work with newness regularly. Information officers also likely to have certain ambivalency concerns with media representatives, particularly in light of Turner's finding that journalistic information officers view their role as one of facilitator; the work of the news media. On the other hand, city officers conform with the media, as Leonard Goldenson's

remarks to the Rear Admiral selectees indicate, are often crisis-oriented. Cherished service-connected values held by Admirals may be threatened by news media coverage, especially if the coverage includes embarrassing revelations, inaccuracies, or biased reporting. These factors lead to the hypothesis that the information officers' attitudes will be more favorable to the news media than the flag officers' will be.

This does not mean that either group can be declared favorable or unfavorable to the media, although some inferences may be drawn. In testing this hypothesis, we cannot measure favorability or unfavorability in an absolute sense, because we cannot measure attitudes on scales that begin at a "zero point" and progress in standardized equal intervals from zero up or down. We can make some general comments about the way Admirals' and PAOs' attitudes seem to compare with current attitudes in American society as a whole. And while it is equally impossible to say whether the American public is "for" or "against" the media, there are some indications that general public opinion is not overwhelmingly favorable to the media. A CBS News poll of a random national telephone sample of 1,136 adults asked this question: "Except in time of war, do you think newspapers, radio and television should have the right to report any story, even if the government feels it's harmful to our national interests?"

The response: Yes, 42 per cent; No, 55 per cent; Sometimes, one per cent; No Response, two per cent. (New York Times, April 16, 1970, p. 37) The Gallup Organization was commissioned by Newsweek magazine to determine attitudes toward the media of a representative sample of 1,560 Americans. The magazine reported (November 9, 1970, p. 22f) that the key finding of this study was that most Americans believe the media do a good job of reporting the news but that many are "vexed by what they consider cases of prejudice, distortion and unfair selectivity." People who tended to be most critical of bias or inaccuracy were those who were best educated and best informed.

We can look at the group attitude indicators and compare them against these very general indicators of American public opinion about the media, but we cannot flatly say that either group is favorable or unfavorable in an absolute sense. What we can do is test Hypothesis 1, and in so doing we should be able to say that one group--either Admirals or PAOs--is more favorable to the media than the other.

(2) Information officers have a reified concept of flag officers, and are able to indicate what they think the attitudes of "most flag officers" are. Flag officers are able to make the same sort of generalization concerning "most information officers," but not to the extent that information officers can.

McLeod and Chaffee (in Tedeschi, 1971) observe: "If we are interested in treating the reification of groups as a measured variable rather than as an assumed property, it is important to state the conditions necessary to reification from the point of view of the person, and to develop appropriate operational definitions for the degree of reification in the person's judgment of a group or collectivity." For purposes of this research, we are quite concerned about reification as an either-or phenomenon, something that is generally either real, or not real, for each of the groups studied. We also would like to know, at least in a loose way, the degree to which each group tends to perceive the other group as a "generalized other." Most information officers have worked for or observed one or more flag officers. The attitudes of flag officers are important to them in the bureaucratic decision-making process. Admirals, for the most part, have had contact with information officers, but there is little likelihood that they have given much thought to what information officers think about the news media. Martin et al. found that newspaper editors in Wisconsin had a generalized impression of their "readers," and Wentz found that ex-Navy men were willing to generalize about the attitudes of the "public," and showed a considerable amount of success in assessing aggregate opinion. It is hypothesized, therefore, that flag officers and information officers recognize each

other as groups whose attitudes can be reified, but that flag officers will find this reification a more uncomfortable mental evolution.

(3) Attitudes of flag officers toward the news media are perceived by information officers as being more unfavorable than they actually are; attitudes of information officers are perceived by Admirals as being more favorable toward the media than they actually are.

Wentz found that his respondents were inaccurate, in an interesting way. They ranked the prestige of "U. S. Navy officer" and "U. S. Navy enlisted man" according to the order in which they thought "a cross-section of the American public" would rank them. Ex-Navy respondents ranked both Navy officers and Navy enlisted men as higher in prestige than a national poll had found them to be, but they thought the poll ranking would be lower than it actually was. If Hypothesis 1 is confirmed, a similar displacement or "contrast effect" (Sherif and Hovland, 1961) in the direction of perceiving less congruency than there actually is would tend to make flag officers see information officers as more favorable to the press than they actually are, and would tend to make information officers see Admirals as more unfavorable to the media than they actually are. Berelson and Steiner report findings indicating that communications down the organizational hierarchy are likely to be critical, and communications up

the hierarchy are likely to be commendatory. Thus some members of organizations are nervously looking upward while their superiors assess them, and bad news is held up or distorted in order to keep the good opinions of those higher up. Critical opinions held by flag officers about the news media, the area of the information officers' work, are more likely to be communicated than commendatory ones, and information officer perceptions of Admirals' attitudes are likely to be distorted. A tendency by information officers to "tell the boss what he wants to hear" might lead to a similar distortion of attitude perception by the flag officers, but "the more rigidly or formally organized the hierarchy, the less upward flow of informal communications." (p. 370) The question here is whether the "contrast effect" described by Sherif and Hovland is affected by distorted or nonexistent upward communication. At any rate, the presumption of this hypothesis is that there is a "communications gap" within the Navy organization that distorts group perceptions.

(4) Information officers are more accurate in estimating flag officer opinions than vice-versa.

As with Hypothesis 2, this hypothesis is based on the presumption that the attitudes of flag officers are more salient and important to information officers than information officers' attitudes are to those at the higher levels of management, and that information officers

therefore make a greater effort to determine flag officer attitudes. Because they try harder, they are more accurate. This sort of reasoning explains Martin's rather surprising finding that Wisconsin newspaper editors had a more accurate perception of their readers' attitudes about riots at the University of Wisconsin than the readers had about the editors' attitudes, despite the fact that the editors were communicating to the readers, presumably. The opinions of the public, we suspect, may have been more salient and important to the editors than vice-versa, despite journalistic folklore to the contrary. Of possible relevance, too, is Wentz' finding that value-oriented mass communicators were more accurate in assessing the public's views than others. The explanation follows this line of reasoning: advertising and public relations men know what values the public holds because that is their main task, whereas those in electronic media are not so accurate in assessing public opinion because they deal in outputs of communications but get few inputs from the public. If we follow similar reasoning, it seems that public affairs officers, constantly involved in scanning the environment to determine the attitudes of various groups and the general public, would tend to be accurate in predicting attitudes. Flag officers get few inputs from the information officers and are not expected to be expert at attitude prediction anyway.

(5) Congruency (perceived agreement) is greater for Admirals than for information officers.

People may think their evaluations are the same as other people's, without that necessarily being the case. This could be called "perceived cognitive overlap," but for simplicity Chaffee and McLeod refer to it as "congruency." If the rationale used for Hypothesis 3 is followed, we see that flag officers can be thought of as being unfavorable toward the news media and as perceiving information officers to be favorable, relatively speaking. Information officers, on the other hand, could be considered as being favorable to the media, while perceiving relative unfavorability on the part of the Admirals. The question here is the degree of difference in these perceived attitudes. If we suppose that there is some sort of distortion of the Admirals' perception of information officer attitudes due to an organizational constraint that calls for the lower ranking officials to "tell the boss what he wants to hear," it is logical to assume that the flag officers perceive more agreement than the information officers perceive.

(6) Both information officers and flag officers are less favorable toward television than toward newspapers, or news magazines--particularly with regard to whether news about the Navy is reported in a fair and unbiased way.

This hypothesis is intuitive and tentative. It presumes a feeling by these groups that television has a

great influence on the American public, and a resultant sensitivity to the television news content that is more pronounced than their sensitivity to newspaper and, certainly, news magazines. It also presumes that the attitudes of these officials may have been affected by public attacks on the objectivity of news coverage in the broadcasting industry initiated by high government spokesmen, especially Vice President Spiro Agnew, in late 1969. These attacks continued through the time of this survey. (Chapter III contains a review of the news environment during this period of time.) A basic tenet involved is the finding that attitudes within a group are particularly subject to influence "by the most respected and prestigious member(s) of the group, the opinion leader(s)." (Berelson and Steiner, 1964, p. 569) Also worth considering is the impact of a CBS television documentary about the management of a torpedo development project by the Navy. "Cost overruns" were highlighted in the program. In addition, it is clear that findings of attitudes critical of television are not unusual in empirical research. Walters (1970) interviewed 76 women at Madison, Wisconsin, and found that 58 per cent indicated strong agreement that television interfered with family activities, and that 49 per cent felt strongly that television was a barrier to family communication. More to the point, Steiner (1963) reported that in a national sample survey, 1,177 men were asked, "Now I would

like to get your opinions about how Radio, Newspapers, Television and Magazines compare. Generally speaking, which of these would you say presents the fairest, most unbiased news?" Responses, by percentage were as follows: newspapers, 31 per cent; television, 28 per cent; radio, 20 per cent; magazines, 11 per cent; and 10 per cent, don't know. These events and findings resulted in Hypothesis 6, which is contrary to an alternate hypothesis that is also backed up by empirical data. The alternate prediction would be that most media audience members think newspapers and news magazines are more biased than the broadcast media, since the broadcasters are bound by government regulations and a "fairness" doctrine. One finds support for this hypothesis in data gathered by the Gallup opinion research firm in December 1969, after Vice President Agnew leveled his accusations against the broadcasters. Gallup's poll contained this question: "There has been much talk about whether the TV networks deal fairly with all sides in presenting the news dealing with political and social issues. How do you feel about this . . . do they deal fairly with all sides or do they tend to favor one side?" Forty per cent of the respondents said TV deals fairly, 42 per cent said it favors one side, 18 per cent had no opinion. Men in the sample said "deal fairly" 39 per cent of the time; "favor one side," 46 per cent; and 15 per cent had no opinion. While this did not represent a ringing

endorsement for television, it nevertheless bettered the score newspapers had on the same question. Only 37 per cent of the total sample said newspapers deal fairly, 45 per cent thought they favor one side. Again, the men in the sample were more positive: 37 per cent said "deal fairly" and 49 per cent said "favor one side." For the reasons cited above, we hypothesize that the results of this national poll will be reversed for the flag and information officers insofar as Navy news is concerned, although there is no reason to think that this hypothesis will be strongly supported.

(7) Both information officers and flag officers believe that other military services are more favored by the media than the Navy is.

It seems natural enough to feel that someone else may be getting a "better deal" than you are. This is certainly likely to be the feeling when naval officers look at media coverage of their service. For one thing, these officers probably tend to select news about their service to watch, read or hear. Since military news is so often crisis or controversy oriented, the result is that these officers are cognizant of a disproportionate amount of "unfavorable" news about their service. It is not hypothesized here, however, that Navy officers necessarily feel that the Army is more favored by the news media than the Navy is. That would be too much to expect, since the

[illegible]

Army had its share of unfortunate and reportable experiences in the Vietnam War. Even before, Navy opinion was that the Army had less public respect than any other service. A sample survey of 583 recently separated Navy and Marine Corps officers and enlisted men conducted by the Harris organization in 1965 for the Navy Department showed that only one per cent of the respondents felt the Army was the most respected service, compared to 46 per cent who felt the Navy was the most respected. Past reputation and publicity were the two most commonly given reasons for these opinions. Why, then, might the Navy's flag and information officers feel that the Air Force and the Marine Corps are favored? Well, if the Army is not, and the Navy is not, the only two left are the Air Force and the Marines. There is little doubt that the Air Force, a young and highly visible service, has been glamorized by the media at times, or that the Marine Corps has regularly been pictured in a heroic mode. At any rate, it is hypothesized that the naval officers will perceive things as being this way insofar as news media coverage is concerned.

Summary of Hypotheses

The hypotheses to be tested in this research, then, are as follows:

H-1. The attitudes of Navy flag officers toward the news media are significantly less favorable than the

way toward an even wealth comparable to Canada's.

Sources of Dissonance

The hypotheses to be tested in this research, then, are as follows:

H-1. The attitudes of Navy flag officers toward the news media are significantly less favorable than the

attitudes of Navy information officers.

H-2. Information officers have a reified concept of flag officers, and are able to indicate what they think the attitudes of "most flag officers" are. Flag officers are able to make the same sort of generalization concerning "most information officers," but not to the same extent that information officers can.

H-3. Attitudes of flag officers toward the news media are perceived by information officers as being more unfavorable than they actually are; attitudes of information officers are perceived by Admirals as being more favorable toward the media than they actually are.

H-4. Information officers are more accurate in estimating flag officer opinions than vice-versa.

H-5. Congruency (perceived agreement) is greater for Admirals than for information officers.

H-6. Both information officers and flag officers are less favorable toward television than toward newspapers, or news magazines--particularly with regard to whether news about the Navy is reported in a fair and unbiased way.

H-7. Both flag officers and information officers believe that other military services are more favored by the media than the Navy is.

B-1. Information officers have a detailed knowledge of Army officers, and are able to indicate what they think the attitudes of "other Army officers" are. Army officers are able to make the same sort of generalization concerning "other information officers," but not to the same degree that information officers can.

B-2. Articles of Army officers reveal the news media are perceived by information officers as having more unfavorable views than they actually are: officers of information offices are perceived by journalists as being more favorable toward the media than they actually are.

B-3. Information officers are more concerned in maintaining Army officer opinions than vice-versa.

B-4. Commitment (perceived agreement) is greater for journalists than for information officers.

B-5. Most information officers and Army officers may have favorable views toward newspapers, as news entities--particularly with respect to whether news about the Army is reported in a fair and unbiased way.

B-6. Most Army officers and information officers believe that military stories are more favored by the media than they are.

CHAPTER III

DESIGN AND MEASURES

The basic instrument of measurement for this study was a self-administered anonymous questionnaire which Navy flag officers and information officers in the Washington, D. C., area were asked to complete in early 1970.

Research Location

The location of the study was Washington for two principal reasons:

(1) Limiting the study to one area provides a uniform mass media menu. In Washington, there is a major morning newspaper, The Washington Post, a major evening newspaper, The Evening Star, and a tabloid afternoon paper, Scripps Howard's Washington Daily News. Other East Coast newspapers are easily available, in particular the New York Times, Wall Street Journal and Baltimore Sun. In addition, most of the respondents are provided a clipping service reprint of articles of interest to the Department of Defense, as well as summaries of television news reports and comment. The three major television network evening news programs are aired in consecutive half-hour time slots, so that viewers may watch one, two, or all three of the network

CHAPTER III

METHOD AND PROCEDURE

The basic instrument of communication for this study was a self-administered questionnaire which dealt with the adoption, use, and influence of television cable systems in the Washington, D. C., area. Data were coded for computer in early 1970.

Sampling Procedure

The location of the study was restricted for two principal reasons:

(1) Limiting the study to one area provided a uniform mass media mix. In Washington, there is a major morning newspaper, The Washington Post, a major evening newspaper, The Evening Star, and a tabloid afternoon paper, Washington's Washington Daily News. Other than cable systems are easily available, in particular the New York Times, Wall Street Journal and Baltimore Sun. In addition, some of the newspapers use personal & slipping service regions at variance of interest to the Department of Defense, as well as summaries of television news reports and summaries. The three major television network evening news programs are aired in consecutive half-hour time slots, so that viewers may watch one, two, or all three of the networks

news programs. ABC's evening news begins at 6:30 p.m., NBC's starts at 7 p.m., and the CBS evening news starts at 7:30. A metro-media television station and other local channels provide non-network news programs. Radio stations offer a variety of formats, and include network outlets. Subscriptions by government offices make most periodicals available.

(2) There are more flag officers and public affairs officers stationed in Washington than at any other location. The 156 Admirals listed in "United States Navy Flag Officers on Active Duty in the Washington, D. C., Area" (Bureau of Naval Personnel, March 1, 1970) represent 46 per cent of all active duty flag officers in the Navy. Of 187 individuals listed on "Public Affairs Officer Roster" (Chief of Information, Navy Department, January 1970), 53 (28 per cent) were in Washington assignments. The remaining flag officers and PAOs are spread all over the world, many of them afloat. Thus, Washington is the only locale in which enough respondents could be contacted to provide statistically reliable estimates for data analysis.

The Survey Groups

(1) Flag officers. Admirals who were in the process of arriving or departing Washington in assignment changes or who were on extended temporary duty assignments away from Washington were excluded from the survey, as were retired flag officers filling active duty billets, and the Chief of

Naval Operations and Vice Chief of Naval Operations. Also excluded were officers at Annapolis, Hyattsville, and Patuxent River, Md. Officers of the rank of Captain who had been selected for promotion to Rear Admiral, but not yet promoted, were included. The total survey population was 141. Of these, 125 responded, for a response rate of 89 per cent.

(2) Public affairs officers. The PAO survey population was 55. Of this number, 51 (93 per cent) responded. These officers were all designated by the Navy in the Special Duty (Public Affairs) category, except for one officer who had served as an enlisted journalist in the Navy and was assigned to the Media Relations Division of the Office of Information on the press desk. Other officers serving in public affairs assignments but not designated as specialists were excluded from the survey.

Questionnaire Construction

The survey questionnaire was developed in a communication research design seminar at the University of Wisconsin. It was constructed in two very similar versions, one for Admirals and one for PAOs. The two versions were the same except for minor changes to make each appropriate for its respondents and to obtain relevant demographic data. Appendix A reproduces the basic questionnaire and indicates the differences between the two versions. The

questionnaire was constructed to measure each respondent's attitude toward the media and his perception of the attitudes of the other group, and to ascertain his information sources.

Variables and Their Measurement

(1) Group Variables. The study proceeds from the assumption that within a role group, attitudes will tend to be somewhat homogeneous. Therefore, the role group to which the respondent belongs becomes a key variable. Characteristics used as variables for sub-group analysis for the flag officers are educational level, source of commission, area of military experience, service college attendance, length of time a flag officer, and previous duty in a public affairs assignment. Variables used for sub-group analysis for the PAOs were educational level, source of commission, length of time in the information specialty, and rank.

(2) Information Sources, the "Multi-Media User," and the "High Media User." Respondents were asked to indicate their utilization of television, radio, and daily newspapers on the basis of whether they watched, heard, or read certain news programs, news reports, and newspapers "never," "rarely," "often," or "daily." Responses were coded on a 0 to 3 scale in ascending order (0 = "never"). In the case of periodicals, respondents were asked to indicate whether

or not they "regularly read" certain publications. Group means and standard deviations were computed for comparative analysis. Also, respondents were divided into categories according to the extent and variety of their media use. Those who watched at least one television news program often or daily, who heard at least one radio station's news reports often or daily, who read at least one newspaper on a daily basis, and who read at least one news magazine regularly were considered "multi-media users" for analysis purposes. As a variation of this, respondents were allotted one point for each television news program watched often or daily, one point for each radio station whose news reports he heard often or daily, one point for each newspaper read daily, and one point for each news magazine read regularly. Respondents with a total of seven or more points were considered "high media users."

(3) Reification. The ability or tendency of Admirals and PAOs to reify the opposite group was measured by analysis of "no opinion" responses to a question that asked individuals to tell whether they thought "most flag officers" (or "most public affairs officers") would tend generally to agree or disagree with certain statements about the news media. Responses of "no opinion" were interpreted as indicating that the respondent could not, or would not, estimate the attitudes of the others in a generalized way. A high percentage of "no opinion"

responses was taken as an indication of a low degree of reification.

(4) Attitude Toward the Media. Respondents were asked to read 11 statements about the news media and to indicate whether they tend generally to agree, disagree, or have no opinion concerning each statement. Three of the statements were specifically designed to determine whether the respondent thought Navy news was fair and unbiased on the television news program or programs he regularly watched, and in the newspapers and news magazines he regularly read. The other eight questions were designed to scale the respondent's general attitude. They obtained measures on his opinions on a variety of statements related to the news media. A scale of favorability and unfavorability to the news media was constructed and scores for the eight general statements were summated and analyzed. A favorable response to a statement was scored as one point, a no opinion or neutral response was scored as two points, and an unfavorable response was scored as three points. The eight statements included five with which agreement was scored as a favorable measure, and three with which agreement was considered unfavorable. The summated point total from these eight measures was used to rate individuals on a scale ranging from eight points (highly favorable to the media) to 24 points (highly unfavorable to the media). To score the maximum number of points, 24, an individual

respondent would have to agree with three statements ("Performance of the media is so bad that people should insist it improve." "There is too much interpretation of the news on television." "Newspaper editorials are overly critical of government."), while disagreeing with five statements ("News about the Navy is reported in a generally fair and unbiased way." "We need aggressive news reporting to insure honesty in government." "Television is doing a good job of reporting the news." "Most reporters are trustworthy." "Newspapers are doing a good job of reporting the news."). To score the optimum favorable number of points, eight, the respondent would have to disagree with the first three statements while agreeing with the last five. Frequency counts and percentages were computed for each of the statements and compared by role group.

(5) Coorientation Between Admirals and PAOs. For analysis purposes, the Admirals and PAOs were divided into "favorable" and "unfavorable" cells of relatively equal size. Sub-analyses of these cells used demographic variables, as well as the "multi-media user" and "high media user" variables.

The coorientation model variables (Chaffee and McLeod, 1968) were derived as follows:

Comparison of group mean attitude scores provided a measure of the agreement coorientation variable.

The eight statements were repeated later in the questionnaire, with Admirals being asked what they thought

most PAOs' attitudes would be, and vice versa. From this a scale was constructed to provide a measure of perceived agreement, the congruency orientation variable.

Comparison of the mean actual score and the mean perceived score for each group provided a measure of the accuracy coorientation variable.

Pretest

A pretest was used to arrive at the method for measurement of the attitudes just described, and to estimate the utility of the questionnaire as a tool for this research. The questionnaire designed for the pretest was similar in format to the final version, but included 13 general statements about the news media instead of eight.

The pretest had the following objectives: to determine whether or not individuals actually thought of the media as being a single object or entity, to assess their willingness to evaluate the media in the prescribed format, to eliminate statements in the questionnaire that might prove ambiguous or difficult to answer, to decide whether or not individuals perceived flag officers and PAOs as "generalized others" as a meaningful reification, and to insure that the questionnaire could be completed rapidly enough to insure an adequate response rate.

In the pretest, the questionnaire was administered to 13 Navy, Marine Corps, Army and civilian information specialists who were not in the group to be surveyed. It

was administered to two senior Navy officers and three civilians who were asked to critique the questionnaire from the point of view of flag officers. It was also reviewed by two professors on the University of Wisconsin journalism faculty.

The pretest showed that there was reason to believe that all those pretested had a mental image of an entity, "the news media," that was appropriate for the conceptualization of the study. It indicated that several would have preferred a less restrictive answer format. They felt that a dichotomized agree/disagree response, with "no opinion" as the only alternative, did not allow enough range for a response which was, for example, 40 per cent agree and 60 per cent disagree. The pretest indicated, however, that the respondents had little trouble in utilizing this format for perceived attitudes, nor was there a problem insofar as perception of generalized "others" was concerned. Inasmuch as the respondents in the pretest did commit themselves to an agree or disagree or no opinion attitude, despite reluctance, and since use of a graded five point or seven point scale would have required a more time-consuming and perhaps more confusing questionnaire, while adding nothing to an aggregated assessment of favorability and unfavorability toward the media, the agree/disagree/no opinion format was retained. To some extent, also, the "no opinion" category provided an index to the degree of reification

by the presidence on the University of Minnesota Journalism
Faculty.

The parent school that there was reason to believe
that all views presented had a certain image of an entity,
"the news media." That was appropriate for the communi-
cation of the study. It indicated that material would have
pertained a less restrictive answer format. They felt that
a dichotomized agree/disagree response, with "no opinion"
as the only alternative, did not allow enough room for a
response which that example, do you want agree and as
per some disagree. The latter indicates, however, that
the respondents had little choice in utilizing fully enough
for personal attitude, nor was there a precise inventory re
perception of journalist "style" was conducted. Imposed
as the responsibility in the project did commit themselves to
an agree or disagree or no opinion decision,
reluctance, and allow one at a second view point or issue
point scale would have required a more time-consuming and
perhaps more confusing dimensions, still making nothing
as an accepted statement of responsibility and initiat-
ority toward the media, the dependent/no opinion
dozen was retained. As more warranted, also "no opinion"
categorically presented an idea as the degree of restriction

perceived by individuals. Those who did not perceive the group as a homogeneous entity would tend to opt for "no opinion" rather than select an agree or disagree option. Five of the 13 statements were eliminated by the pretest as being ambiguous or misleading. For example, the statement "American news media are a valuable intelligence source for Russia" was deleted when it became apparent that this was not a measure of attitude toward the media, but of knowledge or opinion about the techniques of military intelligence.

Administration of the Questionnaire

Questionnaires were distributed by mail or delivered to all prospective respondents during late March and early April 1970. Appendix B reproduces the covering letter used with the questionnaire. The covering letter identified the researcher as a naval officer, and this was done purposely for two reasons: to enhance the response rate and to encourage the respondents to answer with candor. None of the respondents was told that the study would compare flag officer and information officer attitudes.

The News Environment at the Time of the Study

This survey was conducted at a time when most observers felt that the military's public image had suffered a setback because of the Vietnam War. The tendency

to blame the media for delivering bad news has often been discussed, and it should not be discounted in interpreting the results of this survey. Events in Vietnam, the capture of USS Pueblo and a subsequent Court of Inquiry involving the ship's crew, losses of nuclear submarines, collisions at sea, and other incidents created enough bad news for the Navy in the months and years prior to this survey to make naval officers of all ranks and specialties acutely aware of the role of the news media. If they were not aware of this role and its relationship to government, remarks by Vice President Agnew in late 1969 highly critical of the news media may have called it to their attention. In December 1969, Navy Times reported that Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, the Chief of Naval Operations, said the attitude taken by television and the press toward the man in uniform was a dangerous thing. He said this attitude was influencing young men either not to get into the armed service or, having gotten in, not to stay in. The result, he said, could be real trouble for the Navy in the 1980s and 1990s. Admiral Moorer's remarks, according to the service journal, "mirrored the feeling long prevalent in the military that only the bad, the violent and the disruptive make news." (December 10, 1969, p. 4)

In addition, there were these related news reports between February and April 1970:

(1) Dr. Walter Menninger, a member of the National

to blame the media for falsifying and make the myths been
discovered, and it should not be discontinued to differentiate
the results of this survey. Events in Vietnam, the capture
of USS Pueblo and a subsequent court of inquiry investigation
the navy's cover, issues of medical judgments, collisions
at sea, and other questions concern should have for the
navy to live morale and force peace to rise during to make
moral officers of all ranks and specialties acutely aware
of the role of the news media. It may mean the death of
this role and its relationship to government, namely by
type Presidents Eugene De Ieca 1969 Highly critical of the
news media may have called it to their attention. In
December 1969, Navy Times reported that Admiral Thomas H.
Moorer, the Chief of Naval Operations, said the military
cream by falsification and the press reports the men in uniform
was a complete thing. He said this criticism was instead-
ing people was either too to get into the media anything be,
saying wrong in, how to stay in. The result, he said,
could be real trouble for the navy in the years and years.
Admiral Moorer's remarks, according to the Navies Journal,
"stressed the Deeply long grievance in the military that
only the bad, the violent and the disruptive make news."
(December 13, 1969, p. 4)

In addition, there were those unfair news reports
between Pueblo and April 1970;

(1) By. Walter Cronkite, a member of the National

Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, suggested in a speech to the National Press Club in Washington that news reporters be licensed as doctors and lawyers are; Senate Democratic leader Mike Mansfield of Montana said he would oppose strongly any attempt to do so.

(2) Senator Harold Hughes of Iowa charged that the Nixon Administration was embarked on a course of restricting individual liberties. It started, Hughes said, with intimidation of the news media by Vice President Spiro Agnew and Attorney General John N. Mitchell.

(3) Mayor Sam Yorty of Los Angeles accused the news media of bombarding the public with nothing but bad news.

(4) The President of the United Mine Workers of America, Anthony Boyle, said that his union had been the victim of a "journalistic lynching bee" since the murder of union official Joseph A. Yablonski.

(5) Federal Communications Commissioner Nicholas Johnson, a Lyndon Johnson appointee, said that managers of the nation's media were not putting up much of a fight against what he called Nixon Administration news censorship.

(6) Welfare Secretary Robert Finch killed in its infancy a policy calling for written reports on all contacts between newsmen and officials of the National Institute of Mental Health.

(7) Vice President Agnew assailed what he called the "liberal news media" for disseminating "drivel."

(8) Chief Justice of the United States Warren Burger rebuffed a CBS network news team that attempted to cover his speech to the American Bar Association after he had said he would allow no television or radio coverage.

(9) Senator Edmund S. Muskie of Maine was named chairman of a committee of Democratic Party senators to try to repair what they considered an "imbalance" of newspaper and television coverage in favor of the Nixon Administration.

(10) Chairman Dean Burch of the Federal Communication Commission said that Vice President Agnew probably reflected the view of many Americans when he suggested that "kooks" and "oddballs" be ignored by television and radio.

(11) CBS television's "60 Minutes" program on the development of the Mark 48 torpedo included one witness who called the Pentagon's handling of the matter "not a disaster, but an atrocity." Cost overruns were the subject of the report. The Navy originally refused to provide a spokesman to discuss the project on the program, but the civilian Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research and Development did participate.

(12) The first prize essay in the Naval Institute Proceedings annual contest by Captain Robert J. Hanks, U. S. Navy, blasted military critics for what he termed their unfair attacks on the motives, abilities and integrity of the officer corps. In "Against All Enemies," he said it was time for the military officer to speak out publicly in his own defense.

(13) Vice President Agnew charged the news media smeared government officials with "tons and tons of innuendos" published in pursuit of Pulitzer Prizes, while glossing over the "evils of communism." "Our media," he said, "would be well advised to recognize a new dimension of their responsibilities to critically examine our enemies which have no free press to criticize them."

(14) George Reedy, who had served as press secretary to President Lyndon B. Johnson, said all presidents try to manipulate the press but the press as a whole can never be won over and newspapermen eventually "become the enemy."

(15) Herbert G. Klein, President Nixon's director of communications, said he felt that the time had come for "cooling off" of the debate between the broadcast industry and the Administration.

It is obvious from this list that "attitudes toward the news media" can be assumed to be a relevant variable for the study of senior military officers in this time period.

(12) Vice President Quayle changed the news media
assured government officials with "this new form of
journalism" published in general of Postwar Britain, while
pleasing under the "evils of communism." "Our media," he
said, "would be well advised to consolidate a new discussion
of their responsibilities to critically examine our standard
which have no time press to enlighten them."

(13) George Bundy, who had agreed to pursue secretary to
President Lyndon B. Johnson, said all presidents try to
manipulate the press but the press as a whole can never be
won over and consequently "secures the news."

(13) Beckett G. Hinks, President Nixon's director of
communications, said he felt that the news had grown too
"cooling off" of the debate between the broadcast industry
and the Administration.

It is curious that this last term "straitjacket covered
the news media" can be assumed to be a relevant predictor
for the study of media objectivity criteria in this time
period.

CHAPTER IV

RESULTS AND ANALYSES

This chapter consists of findings concerning information sources used by flag officers and public affairs officers, presentation of data used to test the hypotheses of the study, analyses of the data and reports of other relevant findings.

Information Sources

Before examining data relevant to the research hypotheses, we can discuss the news media sources preferred by the respondents and the degree to which these sources were utilized. A general observation here is that public affairs officers consistently reported themselves to be more frequent users of news media than did flag officers, except in certain specific instances and in professional periodical reading.

Selection of news programs and publications showed similar basic patterns for each group, but there were some differences in their preferences. Both Admirals and PAOs seemed to rely more on newspapers than on television or radio.

CHAPTER IV

PROCESS AND STRATEGY

This chapter contains a thinking commentary
interspersed between some of the public and private
efforts efforts, presentation of data used to test the
hypotheses of the study, analysis of the data and reports
of other relevant findings.

Introduction to Process

Before consulting data collected in the research
hypotheses, we can discuss the some basic process problem-
ing by the respondents and the choices to which these
sources were utilized. A general observation both in the
public efforts efforts successfully received discussions to
be more frequent users of more media than self study
utilizers, except in certain specific instances and in
personnel peripheral reading.

Selection of news features and publications showed
student basic patterns for each group, but there were some
differences in their preferences. Both schools and time
seemed to vary more on newspapers than on television as
media.

a. Newspapers. The Washington Post was easily the newspaper read most frequently by respondents in each group. The Post achieved a mean reading score among flag officers of 2.6 and among public affairs officers of 2.8. (Three points were allotted for "daily" reading, two points for "often," one point for "rarely" and no points for "never.") Looking at it in a slightly different way, 78 per cent of the Admirals said they read this paper daily and another nine per cent read it often; 82 per cent of the PAOs read this paper daily and all the others read it often. Flag officers reported themselves more frequent readers of the Wall Street Journal and New York Times than did information officers. PAOs were much more likely to read the tabloid Scripps-Howard Washington Daily News than were Admirals. A total of 54 per cent of flag officers and 80 per cent of information officers also said they regularly read the Department of Defense press clipping service. Table 1 shows mean reading scores for newspapers.

b. Television. Public affairs officers reported themselves more frequent viewers in all categories. The CBS and NBC evening news programs were clearly the most frequent choices of the two groups. Within groups, PAOs favored the CBS evening news program slightly, while flag officers watched NBC more often than CBS. NBC led CBS as a morning news source for both groups. Table 2 shows mean viewing scores for television news.

TABLE 1

DAILY NEWSPAPERS READ BY ADMIRALS AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICERS

	Mean Reading Scores[a]	
	Admirals	PAOs
Washington Daily News (evening)	.3	1.1
Baltimore Sun (morning)	.2	.6
Washington Star (evening)	1.7	2.1
Washington Post (morning)	2.6	2.8
New York Times (morning)	1.6	1.5
Wall Street Journal (morning)	1.8	1.0
All others	.1	.5
(N)	(125)	(51)

[a]Arranged in order from highest PAO/Admiral ratio to lowest.

TABLE 2

TELEVISION NEWS VIEWING BY ADMIRALS AND PAOs

	Mean Viewing Scores[a]	
	Admirals	PAOs
NBC Today Show (morning)	.5	1.0
CBS Morning News	.1	.2
CBS Evening News (7:30 p.m.)	1.1	1.9
ABC Evening News (6:30 p.m.)	.7	1.0
NBC Evening News (7:00 p.m.)	1.3	1.7
All Others	.5	1.0
(N)	(125)	(51)

[a]Arranged in order from highest PAO/Admiral ratio to lowest.

Table 1

DAILY NEWSPAPER READ BY RANDOMLY AND PUBLIC OPINION OPERATIONS

Newspaper	Readership	Mean Reading Process[a]
Washington Daily News (evening)	.3	1.1
Baltimore Sun (morning)	.2	.9
Washington Star (evening)	1.7	3.1
Washington Post (morning)	2.6	3.9
New York Times (morning)	1.8	3.8
Wall Street Journal (morning)	1.0	3.0
All others	.1	.3
(N)	(120)	(31)

[a]Arranged in order from highest readership ratio to lowest.

Table 2

TELEVISION NEWS VIEWING BY RANDOMLY SAMPLED MEN OVER

Program	Television	Mean Viewing Income[a]
NBC Today Show (morning)	.9	3.0
CBS Morning News	.1	.1
CBS Evening News (7:30 p.m.)	1.1	3.3
ABC Evening News (6:30 p.m.)	.7	3.0
NBC Evening News (7:00 p.m.)	1.3	3.7
All Others	.6	3.0
(N)	(120)	(31)

[a]Arranged in order from highest readership ratio to lowest.

c. Radio. Again, PAOs rated themselves more frequent media users in all categories. The ABC news affiliate in Washington, WMAL, was most often selected by each group. WTOP, a CBS station with a "nonstop news" format, was second with the flag officers but was slightly less frequently heard by PAOs than WRC, the NBC radio news outlet. For each group there was a positive correlation between WTOP and "other" radio news programs, indicating a probable tendency to listen to stations with attractive music as alternates to the all-news station. Comments by respondents indicated that radio news is heard quite a lot in automobiles during the trip to and from work. Other respondents commented that they chose stations because of the type of music played rather than for news content. Table 3 gives radio news listening scores.

d. News Magazines. For the three publications categorized as news magazines in this study, PAOs were more regular readers than Admirals. Table 4 shows that Time was regularly read by more Admirals and PAOs than either of the other two. PAOs were much more frequent readers of Newsweek than flag officers, but readership of the conservative U. S. News and World Report was about the same for each group. For Admirals, being a regular reader of U. S. News was just as likely as being a regular reader of Newsweek. Since national readership of the former does not approach Newsweek's, this finding may indicate an

TABLE 3

RADIO STATION NEWS REPORTS HEARD BY ADMIRALS AND PAOs

	Mean Listening Scores[a]	
	Admirals	PAOs
WRC (NBC)	.5	1.2
WMAL (ABC)	1.2	1.5
WTOP (CBS)	.9	1.1
All Others	.8	1.2

[a]Arranged in order from highest PAO/Admiral ratio to lowest.

TABLE 4

NEWS MAGAZINES READ REGULARLY BY ADMIRALS AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICERS

	Percentage Regular Readers[a]	
	Admirals	PAOs
Newsweek	34	61
Time	56	67
U. S. News and World Report	34	35
(N)	(125)	(51)

[a]Arranged in order from highest PAO/Admiral ratio to lowest.

WBC (thou)	.8	1.2
RBCs (Mill)	1.2	1.8
HGB (GGM)	.9	1.3
All others	.8	1.4

[a]Arranged in order from highest freq/Publ#1 ratio to lowest.

Sparrows	14	41
Crows	29	87
W. B. Hens and Mourn Doves	11	29
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

[a]Arranged in order from highest freq/Publ#1 ratio to lowest.

independent decision by the flag officers in favor of the more conservative editorial policy.

e. Professional and military-oriented periodicals. In this category, flag officers were clearly more avid readers than information officers. More than twice as many Admirals as PAOs said they read Armed Forces Management, for example. The groups were about equal in readership of general interest military-oriented publications such as Navy Times, Armed Forces Journal, and All Hands, a monthly magazine published by the Navy. Another Navy publication, Direction magazine, which provides guidance to commanding officers and public affairs officers, was read by almost all of the PAOs and by almost none of the Admirals. Commanders Digest, a newsletter-type publication of the Defense Department intended primarily for the management level, was more regularly read by Admirals by a 3-2 margin. Readership of Navy Times, a weekly newspaper, was highest overall. Eighty per cent of both admirals and public affairs officers read it. Table 5 shows comparisons for the periodicals in this category.

f. Other periodicals. Table 6 indicates that readership percentages for periodicals in this category were generally lower than for professional and military-oriented periodicals, and group preferences were mixed. More Admirals (48 per cent) than PAOs (41 per cent) were readers of National Geographic, which topped other

independent decision by the City officers in favor of the more conservative editorial policy.

4. Fraternal and military-oriented publications.

In this category, City officers were closely more with readers than information officers. More than half Majority as Hub and they read Armed Forces Newsmen, for example. The groups were about equal in readership of general interest military-related publications such as Army Times, Naval Forces Journal, and Air Force. A monthly magazine published by the Army. Fourteen Army publications, Directorate magazines, which provide guidance to commanding officers and public affairs officers, was read by almost all of the Hubs and by almost none of the Majority.

Conservative Digest. A newsletter-type publication of the Defense Department intended primarily for the management level, was more regularly read by Majority by a 3-2 margin. Readership of Stock Digest, a weekly newsgroup, was somewhat overall. Eighty per cent of both majority and public affairs officers read it. Table 5 shows comparisons for the periodicals in this category.

5. Other periodicals. Twelve periodicals that were generally lower than for professional and civilian-oriented publications, and group preferences were mixed. More Majority (62 per cent) than readers of National Geographic, which topped other

TABLE 5

PROFESSIONAL AND MILITARY-ORIENTED PERIODICAL READING BY ADMIRALS AND PAOs

	Percentage Regular Readers[a]	
	Admirals	PAOs
Broadcasting[b]	0	10
Direction	7	80
All Hands	70	78
Navy	50	53
Navy Times	80	80
Armed Forces Journal	57	53
Naval Institute Proceedings	66	51
Commanders Digest	61	41
Naval Aviation News	34	22
Aviation Week & Space Technology	26	14
Armed Forces Management	56	24
Undersea Technology	17	4
Scientific American[b]	5	0
Foreign Affairs[b]	6	0
(N)	(125)	(51)

[a]Arranged in order from highest PAO/Admiral ratio to lowest.

[b]Not on questionnaire check list; written in.

TABLE 3

PERCENTAGES, AND MILITARY-ORIENTED VOCATIONAL ADVICE
BY CONDITION AND SEX

Condition	Advice	Type
Procedure Regular Members[a]		
Coordination[b]	0	10
Direction	7	20
All Hands	20	73
Navy	10	17
Navy Ships	80	80
Armed Forces Journal	57	53
Naval Executive Proceedings	40	81
Commanders Digest	41	41
Naval Aviation News	14	23
Aviation Week & Space		
Technology	20	14
Armed Forces Management	56	24
Undersea Technology	17	4
Statistic Musician[b]	5	0
Record Artist[b]	6	0
(2)	(110)	(61)

[a]Arranged in order from highest pro/neutral ratio to lowest.

[b]Not on Questionnaire check list; written in.

TABLE 6

OTHER PERIODICAL READING BY ADMIRALS AND PAOs

	Percentage Regular Readers[a]	
	Admirals	PAOs
Sports Illustrated[b]	0	8
Playboy	11	37
TV Guide	5	16
Look	18	29
Atlantic	5	8
Life	33	39
Business Week	20	18
National Geographic	48	41
Reader's Digest	37	25
Harpers	6	4
Fortune	20	6
National Observer[b]	5	0
(N)	(125)	(51)

[a]Arranged in order from highest PAO/Admiral ratio to lowest.

[b]Not on questionnaire check list; written in.

TABLE 6

OTHER PROFESSIONAL POSITIONS BY AGENCIES AND TYPE

Agency	Professional position held by respondent[a]	
	Type	
Opera Illustrated[b]	C	8
Playboy	11	17
TV Guide	3	10
Time	13	23
Atlantic	3	3
Life	13	19
Business Week	10	10
National Geographic	10	41
Reader's Digest	17	23
Esquire	6	4
Portune	10	6
National Observer[b]	5	C
(n)	(132)	(31)

[a] Percentage is column free to Observer PRO/Natural ratio to Observer.

[b] Too os quantitative check like; written in.

periodicals in this category in both groups' readership. Fortune readers among the flag officers outnumbered those in the PAO group by more than 3-1. Life and Look were more regularly read by information officers than by flag officers, and Reader's Digest more regularly by Admirals than PAOs. TV Guide, the leading magazine in national circulation, was read by only five per cent of the Admirals and 16 per cent of PAOs. And what sort of man reads Playboy? Well, in the Navy it is more likely to be a public affairs officer (37 per cent) than a flag officer (11 per cent). It is impossible to control this finding for age.

Tests of Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1 predicted that attitudes of flag officers toward the news media would be significantly less favorable than attitudes of information officers. In the test of this hypothesis, a low summated attitude score indicates favorability toward the news media on eight attitude measuring statements. Possible scores range from eight to 24. The mean summated attitude score for flag officers is 16.9, with a standard deviation of 4.3. The mean summated attitude score for public affairs officers is 11.7, with a standard deviation of 3.1. This clearly supports the hypothesis ($z = 8.97$, $p < .001$); the flag officers, as a group, rate themselves as dramatically less favorable toward the media than do the information officers

as a group. Moreover, as Table 7 indicates, flag officers had significantly less favorable attitudes than information officers on each of the separate measuring statements.

These data strongly suggest that Admirals and PAOs have different attitudes toward the media, but do not indicate why. One possibility is that favorability toward the media is based on media consumption. Accordingly, the "multi-media users" were separated from individuals who did not meet the "multi-media" criteria defined in Chapter III. Table 8 shows a comparison of summated attitude scores for multi-media user Admirals and multi-media user PAOs, and indicates that multi-media use does not account for the difference in group attitudes. Multi-media Admirals had exactly the same attitude score as other Admirals, and multi-media PAOs were slightly less favorable to the news media than other PAOs. Differences between Admiral and PAO group scores continued to be statistically significant.

In a similar test, the results of which are also shown in Table 8, "high media users" were compared with others in their groups. While high media user Admirals had a mean attitude score that was somewhat (but non-significantly) more favorable to the media than others, high media user PAOs had a mean attitude score that was somewhat less favorable (but also non-significantly) than other PAOs. Again the predicted differences between Admiral and PAO

TABLE 7

AGREEMENT WITH STATEMENTS ABOUT THE NEWS MEDIA, BY ADMIRALS AND PAOs

Favorable Statements		Admirals (N=125)	PAOs (N=51)	
"News about the Navy is reported in a generally fair and unbiased way."	Agree	50%	90%	
	No Opinion	4	4	$z = 7.05$
	Disagree	46	6	$p < .001$
"We need aggressive news reporting to insure honesty in government."	Agree	57	82	
	No Opinion	11	8	$z = 4.00$
	Disagree	32	10	$p < .001$
"Television is doing a good job of reporting the news."	Agree	34	65	
	No Opinion	6	2	$z = 3.63$
	Disagree	60	33	$p < .001$
"Most reporters are trustworthy."	Agree	44	86	
	No Opinion	23	6	$z = 5.93$
	Disagree	33	8	$p < .001$
"Newspapers are doing a good job of reporting the news."	Agree	42	86	
	No Opinion	8	4	$z = 6.75$
	Disagree	50	10	$p < .001$

TABLE 7 (Continued)

Unfavorable Statements		Admirals (N=125)	PAOs (N=51)	
"Performance of the media is so bad that people should insist it improve."	Agree	53%	22%	
	No Opinion	14	0	$z = 5.35$
	Disagree	34	78	$p < .001$
"There is too much interpretation of the news on television."	Agree	71	45	
	No Opinion	9	2	$z = 3.67$
	Disagree	21	53	$p < .001$
"Newspaper editorials are overly-critical of government."	Agree	59	37	
	No Opinion	11	2	$z = 3.42$
	Disagree	30	61	$p < .001$

(تابع) جدول ٢

TABLE 8

FAVORABILITY TOWARD THE MEDIA, BY MEDIA USE INDICES

	Admirals		PAOs		Row Significance Test
	Mean	(N)	Mean	(N)	
Multi-media Users	16.9	(52)	11.9	(37)	$z = 6.33$, $p < .001$
Others	16.9	(73)	11.0	(14)	$z = 6.28$, $p < .001$
Column Significance Test	$z = .0$ n.s.		$z = .95$ n.s.		
High Media Users	15.7	(40)	12.0	(31)	$z = 3.94$, $p < .001$
Others	17.5	(85)	10.8	(20)	$z = 8.27$ $p < .001$
Column Significance Test	$z = .69$ n.s.		$z = 1.36$ n.s.		

Notes: (1) Low mean score indicates more favorable attitude toward media.

(2) "Multi-media users" read one or more newspapers daily, watch one or more television news programs often, hear radio news often, and read a news magazine regularly. "High media users" rely on at least seven different news sources on a regular basis, but not necessarily on a variety of types of media.

ملحق 8

[illegible]

[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

groups were significant, regardless of the level of media use.

On the basis of this analysis, it appears that neither variety of media use, as typified by the multi-media user, nor quantity of media consumption can explain the difference between the two groups of officers in their attitudes toward the media.

Another possibility is that educational level is related to attitude toward the media. To examine this, respondents who had one or more years of postgraduate study were separated from those who had done only undergraduate work. (All but one of the 176 respondents indicated at least four years of college, and that one said he had "3½.") Table 9 shows the results of the analysis of attitude scores divided this way. Again, Hypothesis 1 is supported, and educational level appears to have a negligible relationship to attitude scores.

There is the possibility that flag officers who have served in public affairs assignments at some time during their career hold attitudes toward the media that are not significantly different from PAO attitudes. Table 10 shows the results of a test of this supposition. It indicates that although flag officers with PAO experience had a more favorable score than other flag officers (very close to a statistically significant level), their score is still significantly less favorable than that of

groups were significant, conservatives at the level of media use.

In the light of this analysis, it appears that neither variety of media use, as typified by the multimedia exec, nor quantity of media consumption can explain the difference between the two groups of citizens in their attitudes toward the media.

Another possibility is that educational level is related to overlaps between the media. To examine this, respondents who had one or more years of postgraduate study were collapsed into those who had done only undergraduate work. (Exit one of the 110 respondents indicated an answer from "some of college, but fewer than four years.") Again, Hypothesis 1 is supported, and educational level appears to have a negligible relationship to attitude scores.

There is the possibility that elite officials who have entered the public affairs mainstream at some time during their careers hold attitudes toward the media that are not significantly different from the electorate. Table 10 shows the results of a test of this proposition. It indicates that although elite officials with BAO experience have a more favorable view of the media (very close to a statistically significant level), their scores is still significantly less favorable than that of

TABLE 9

FAVORABILITY TOWARD THE MEDIA, BY EDUCATIONAL LEVEL

	Admirals		PAOs		Row Significance Test
	Mean	(N)	Mean	(N)	
College only	16.5	(28)	11.6	(25)	$z = 4.37$, $p < .001$
Some Post-graduate study	17.0	(97)	11.8	(26)	$z = 7.33$, $p < .001$
Column Significance Test	$z = .51$ n.s.		$z = .22$ n.s.		

Note: Low mean score indicates favorable attitude toward media; "Some Postgraduate Study" indicates one or more years.

TABLE 10

FAVORABILITY TOWARD THE MEDIA, AMONG OFFICERS WITH PAO EXPERIENCE

	Admirals		PAOs		Row Significance Test
	Mean	(N)	Mean	(N)	
PAO duty	15.8	(16)	11.7	(51)	$z = 3.60$, $p < .001$
No PAO duty	17.1	(109)	-	-	-
Column Significance Test	$z = 1.60$ n.s.				

Note: $z = 1.69$, $p < .05$

TABLE 3

PROBABILITY MAKING THE CHOICE, AS FUNCTION OF TARGET TARGET

	Behavior		Prob		Sig. Difference
	Mean	(N)	Mean	(N)	Test
Option only	16.3	(72)	11.9	(73)	$z = 4.37$, $p < .001$
Some Postponed Penalty	17.0	(93)	11.8	(74)	$z = 1.33$, $p < .001$
Column Significance Test	$z = .51$ n.s.		$z = .13$ n.s.		

Note: Low mean score indicates Favorable selling move prefer.

TABLE 14

PROBABILITY TAKING THE MEDIA, AMONG OPPOSING WINE AND BEER STRATEGY

	Behavior		Prob		Sig. Difference
	Mean	(N)	Mean	(N)	Test
Pro Duty	15.8	(16)	11.7	(21)	$z = 1.60$, $p < .001$
No Pro Duty	17.1	(109)	—	—	—
Column Significance Test	$z = 1.00$ n.s.				

Note: $z = 1.96$, $p < .05$

PAOs.

Additional partialing analyses separated individuals within each group according to characteristics that might account for the between-group differences in attitude scores. For a quick look at the data, flag officer and information officer scores were dichotomized according to whether favorability toward the media was "high" or "low." There were 62 flag officers in the high favorability cell with 8 to 17 points on the attitude measurement scale, and 63 in the low favorability cell with 18-24 points. PAOs were divided with 24 in the high favorability cell (8-11 points) and 27 in the low cell (12-18 points). Table 11 gives the results of this analysis, which can be summarized as follows: Flag officers who had attended a service college such as the Naval War College or National War College tended to have more favorable attitudes toward the media than those who attended no service college; source of an Admiral's commission (i.e., whether Naval Academy or not) had almost no relation to attitude toward the media; those who had been flag officers for less than five years were slightly more favorable to the media than their seniors; and those whose experience was in surface ships were more favorable than staff or special duty Admirals, aviators or submariners. None of these differences was significant. For PAOs, favorability decreased with rank, except that the highest ranking, the Captains, scored more

TABLE 11

FAVORABILITY TOWARD THE MEDIA, BY GROUP INDICES

Favorability Cell							Significance Test
				Percentage Flag Officers			
				1-4 years	5 or more		
High				52	45		z = .81
Low				48	55		n.s.
(N)				(63)	(58)		
				No PAO Duty	PAO Duty		
High				48	62.5		z = 1.12
Low				52	37.5		n.s.
(N)				(109)	(16)		
				Naval Academy	Other		
High				50.5	47		z = .32
Low				49.5	53		n.s.
(N)				(95)	(30)		
				No Service College	Service College		
High				39	53		z = 1.40
Low				61	47		n.s.
(N)				(33)	(92)		
	Aviation	Surface		Submarine	Staff or Special Duty		
High	45.5	57		47	45		z = 1.17
Low	54.5	43		43	55		n.s. (surface vs. all others)
(N)	(33)	(42)		(19)	(31)		
				Percentage Public Affairs Officers			
	Ensigns	LTJG	LT	LTCDR	CDR	CAPT	
High	100	100	56	48	11	62.5	
Low	0	0	44	52	89	37.5	
(N)	(1)	(1)	(9)	(23)	(9)	(8)	

TABLE 11

BY-SEX/ABILITY TOWARD THE MIDDLE, BY GROUP IDENTITY

Travel-ability Cell	Upward-looking Task
High	52
Low	48
(n)	(83)
High	40
Low	59
(n)	(100)
High	50.5
Low	49.5
(n)	(79)
High	29
Low	71
(n)	(33)
High	49.3
Low	50.8
(n)	(63)
(n)	(83)

favorably than Commanders, Lieutenant Commanders, or Lieutenants.

It appeared from this that public affairs officers with the rank of Commander might score near enough to the Admirals' score to eliminate group differences. Table 12 compares these scores. They remained statistically significant ($z = 2.99$, $p < .01$). Still another possibility was that PAOs with less than four years of PAO duty, if separated from the other PAOs, would leave a PAO group with no significant difference in score from the Admirals. Table 13 presents the data from this test. Again, significant differences occurred between the PAOs and Admirals.

All these tests of Hypothesis 1 show a single significant relationship in respondents' attitudes toward the media: flag officers are less favorable than information officers, and there seem to be no factors of either career history or media use that explain the difference. This is rather strong evidence in support of the reasoning that led to Hypothesis 1; i.e., the difference is most likely attributable to the different bureaucratic roles played by these officers.

Hypothesis 2 was formulated to test the proposition that Admirals and public affairs officers perceived each others' attitudes as reifications, and that PAOs were more likely to reify flag officer attitudes than vice versa.

When Admirals and PAOs were asked to say whether

Theorem: Any Consumer, Independent Commodities, or
Dimensions.

If imposed from this that public utilities pricing
with two or more of dimensional rights cannot be fair
equitable' means to eliminate enough differences. Public is
compare these scores. They received statistically
significant ($z = 2.89$, $p < .01$). Still another possibility
was that ride with less than four years of PRO duty, if
compared from the other PROs, would lower a PRO group with
no adjustment difference in score from the Manhyte.
Table 13 presents the data from this test. Again, signifi-
cant differences occurred between the PROs and Manhyte.

All these cases of hypothesis 1 show a simple
significant relationship in respondents' attitudes toward
the media; they officers are less favorable than information
tion officers, and there seem to be no function of either
whose history or media use that explain the difference.
This is unclear along evidence in support of the remaining
five led to hypothesis 1: 1.e., the difference is more
likely restricted to the different hierarchy value
played by these officers.

Hypothesis 2 was formulated to test the proposition
that Manhyte and Public Affairs officers perceived news
people' relations as unfriendly, and that PIOs were more
likely to verify City Police relations than vice versa.

TABLE 12

FAVORABILITY TOWARD THE MEDIA, PAOs OF COMMANDER RANK COMPARED TO FLAG OFFICERS

Admirals		PAO Commanders		
Mean	(N)	Mean	(N)	Significance Test
16.9	(125)	13.4	(9)	$z = 2.99$, $p<.01$

Note: Low score indicates favorability toward media.

TABLE 13

FAVORABILITY TOWARD THE MEDIA, BY NUMBER OF YEARS AS A PAO

	Admirals		PAOs		Row Significance Test
	Mean	(N)	Mean	(N)	
PAOs for 1-4 years	*	*	10.8	(16)	$z = 8.36$ $p < .001$
PAOs for 5 years or more	*	*	12.1	(35)	$z = 7.27$ $p < .001$
Column Significance Test			$z = 1.59$ n.s.		

*For comparative purposes, totals for all Admirals (mean 16.9, N=125) were tested against PAO totals.

Note: Low mean score indicates favorability toward media.

TABLE 12

PROBABILITY STATING THIS RESULT, FROM OF COMPARISON BOARD
DIFFERENCE TO BLAZE DIRECTIONS

Means	(1)	Means	(2)	Significance Test
16.5	(123)	13.4	(3)	$z = 2.84$, $p < .01$

Notes: Low score indicates favorability toward media.

TABLE 13

FAVORABILITY TOWARD THE MEDIA, BY EXPOSURE OF STORE AS A PAD

	Industrie		Media		Sum Significance Test
	Means	(N)	Means	(N)	
Film for 1-4 years	*	*	16.4	(15)	$z = 3.34$ $p < .001$
Film for 5 years or more	*	*	13.1	(20)	$z = 7.17$ $p < .001$
Column Significance Test			$z = 1.55$ n.s.		

*For comparative purposes, include the all industria (mean 16.5, N=123) mean ranked against film results.

Notes: Low mean score indicates favorable favorability toward media.

they thought most of the other group would tend generally to agree or disagree with eight attitude measuring statements about the news media, "no opinion" responses were consistently higher for the Admirals than for the PAOs, indicating that the Admirals were more unable or unwilling to generalize about PAO attitudes than PAOs were about Admirals' attitudes. Table 14 shows the responses for each group. One statement called for two reifications--individuals were asked what they thought about "most reporters." On this question, flag officers chose "no opinion" 37 per cent of the time when assessing the PAO group's attitude. When giving their own attitude, many were also unable to generalize, 23 per cent opting for "no opinion." PAOs, on the other hand, had no problem in generalizing about reporters, just as they had none in generalizing about flag officers. (See Table 7.)

These data indicate that both groups perceived each others' attitudes as reifications, and that PAOs were significantly more likely to have a generalized picture of flag officer attitudes than vice versa.

Hypothesis 3 predicts that flag officer attitudes toward the news media will be perceived by information officers as being more unfavorable than they actually are, and that attitudes of information officers will be perceived by Admirals as being more favorable toward the media than they actually are. Hypothesis 4 is that information

TABLE 14

PERCEPTIONS OF OTHERS' ATTITUDES, BY ADMIRALS AND PAOs

Favorable Statements		Admirals' (N=125) Perceptions of PAO Attitudes	PAOs' (N=51) Perceptions of Admirals' Attitudes
"News about the Navy is reported in a generally fair and unbiased way."	Agree	43%	22%
	No Opinion	30	2
	Disagree	27	76
"We need aggressive news reporting to insure honesty in government."	Agree	50	57
	No Opinion	35	8
	Disagree	15	35
"Television is doing a good job of reporting the news."	Agree	38	22
	No Opinion	32	4
	Disagree	30	74
"Most reporters are trustworthy."	Agree	40	33
	No Opinion	37	4
	Disagree	23	63
"Newspapers are doing a good job of reporting the news."	Agree	41	33
	No Opinion	32	2
	Disagree	27	65

| | | |

TABLE 14 (Continued)

Unfavorable Statements		Admirals' (N=125) Perceptions of PAO Attitudes	PAOs' (N=51) Perceptions of Admirals' Attitudes
"Performance of the media is so bad that people should insist it improve."	Agree	26%	63%
	No Opinion	36	6
	Disagree	38	31
"There is too much interpretation of the news on television."	Agree	42	74
	No Opinion	34	6
	Disagree	24	20
"Newspaper editorials are overly-critical of government."	Agree	43	67
	No Opinion	38	4
	Disagree	19	29

Significance test for overall mean "No Opinion" scores: $z = 5.88$, $p < .001$

Chart 11 (continued)

officers are more accurate in estimating flag officer opinions than vice-versa. Hypothesis 5 is that congruency (perceived agreement) is greater for Admirals than for information officers. Figure 2 presents summated mean scores for the coorientation variables. The results strongly support these inter-related hypotheses, with one exception.

Public affairs officers' perceptions of Admirals' attitudes toward the media have a mean summated score of 18.7, compared to the flag officers' actual score of 16.9. ($z = 2.73$, $p < .01$) Flag officers' perceptions of public affairs officers' attitudes have a mean score of 15.4, compared to the actual 11.7 score. ($z = 6.73$, $p < .001$) Thus, as predicted, information officers are more accurate than flag officers, but in each case the perceptions are significantly in error. Also, congruency is greater for Admirals, who perceive information officers' mean score as +1.5 from their own score. ($z = 2.94$, $p < .01$) Information officers perceive a huge lack of agreement ($z = 10.29$, $p < .001$) between their score and the Admirals'. The direction and extent of error in perception is as predicted for the public affairs officers. They think the flag officers are more hostile to the media than they actually are. But the prediction about Admirals' perception is only partially supported. Although the direction in the Admirals' perception of PAO attitudes is as expected (the

citizens may even volunteer in watchdog fire office operations than "drive-ins". Procedure 3 is that condition (perceived responsibility to prevent fire hazards than for indoctrinating citizens. Figure 3 presents summarized means for the counteraction variables. The results strongly support these inter-related hypotheses, with one exception.

Public utility citizens' perceptions of Mobiria's attitude toward the media have a mean assessed score of 19.7, compared to the fire officials' actual score of 16.1. ($t = 3.17$, $p < .02$) Fire citizens' perceptions of public affairs citizens' activities have a mean score of 12.6, compared to the actual 11.7 score. ($t = 8.73$, $p < .001$) Thus, as predicted, interviewers attribute too much success when fire officials. Due to media bias the perceptions are significantly in error. Also, contrarily to prediction Mobiria, who perceive information officers' news space as 41.3 from their own score. ($t = 2.94$, $p < .01$) Information officers perceive a huge lack of agreement ($t = 10.17$, $p < .001$) between their score and the Mobiria's. The direction and degree of error in perception is as predicted for the public affairs officers. They think the fire officers are more hostile to the media than they actually are. But the discrepancy among Mobiria's perception is only partially explained. Although the direction in the Mobiria's perception of the variables is as expected (the



Fig. 2.--Coorientation Model with Agreement, Accuracy, and Congruency Scores* for Flag Officers (N=125) and Public Affairs Officers (N=51) Attitudes Toward the News Media.

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*Note: Low mean attitude score indicates favorability toward the media.



Admirals think information officers are significantly more favorable toward the media than the Admirals themselves are), they clearly believe the PAOs are significantly less favorable toward the media than PAOs actually are ($z = 6.73$, $p < .001$), and this is contrary to Hypothesis 3 and to Sherif and Hovland's theory of "contrast effect." This unexpected finding is discussed below.

Hypothesis 6 holds that both groups are less favorable toward television than toward newspapers or news magazines, and that this is particularly the case where the fairness and unbiased nature of news about the Navy is in question. Data presented in Table 15 generally support this hypothesis. PAO attitudes are significantly more favorable to news magazines and newspapers than to television. Admirals' attitudes are significantly more favorable toward news magazines than television and they are more favorable overall toward newspapers than toward television, but not to a statistically significant degree.

There is an anomaly in that Admirals indicated more favorability toward television when asked whether or not they tend generally to agree that Navy news is fair and unbiased on the television news program(s) they regularly watch and in the newspaper(s) and news magazine(s) they regularly read. One possible explanation for this is that their attitudes relate to specific newspapers and television news programs. The near monopoly of the liberal Washington

TABLE 15

ATTITUDES TOWARD TELEVISION, NEWSPAPERS AND NEWS MAGAZINES
BY ADMIRALS AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICERS

	Mean Attitude Scores[a]					
	Television		Newspapers		News Magazines	
	Adms	PAOs	Adms	PAOs	Adms	PAOs
"Navy news . . . is fair and unbiased."	2.0	1.5	2.2	1.3	1.8	1.3
"Doing a good job of reporting the news."	2.3	1.7	2.1	1.2	-	-
"Too much interpretation."	2.5	1.9	-	-	-	-
"Editorials overly critical."	-	-	2.3	1.8	-	-
Mean Sum	2.3	1.7	2.2	1.4	1.8	1.3
(N)	(125)	(51)	(125)	(51)	(125)	(51)

[a]Low score indicates favorability. Range 1-3.

Significance tests of mean scores

Admirals: TV/Newspapers $z = .90$ n.s.
TV/News Magazines $z = 3.64$, $p < .001$
PAOs: TV/Newspapers $z = 1.77$, $p < .05$
TV/News Magazines $z = 2.35$, $p < .01$

جدول (٤)

مقارنة بين متوسطات درجات عينة الدراسة في مقياس الاتجاه نحو الرياضيات

المتغيرات									

Post as the local morning newspaper can be contrasted with a television menu consisting of three network news programs in prime evening news viewing hours and several other network and local news shows, and with the trio of news magazines that are available. Additionally, some of the flag officers indicated dissatisfaction with the Post in written comments in this survey. One said, for example:

> In my opinion the Washington Post is a dangerous newspaper. Since it is the only morning newspaper, it has too (much) circulation, thereby influencing many citizens. It is super liberal, anti-government, and its destructive criticism seldom offers workable solutions for the real-world. I also resent the government subsidizing it by buying thousands of copies every morning for the various government offices, but I have no solution since it's the only local morning newspaper with adequate coverage, and I'm forced to read it myself tho I almost regurgitate over the editorial page. I do much better at night with the Star. (Flag officer number 85)

On the other hand, this was not a universal opinion. One Admiral said:

> I enjoy my daily Washington Post--I read it from cover to cover. I like the thorough coverage of world events in the Post. I generally tend to oppose their editorial slant and the Herblock cartoons but I am stimulated to appreciate the unfavorable twist an observer can take: makes me try to do better. (Flag officer number 39)

To explore the possibility that attitude toward this particular newspaper was associated with an unfavorable attitude toward newspapers vis-a-vis television and news magazines on this attitude item, a comparison was made between responses to the attitude statements and television news programs watched daily or often, newspapers read often

Most of the local activity newspaper can be contracted with a television news marketing of three network news programs in prime evening news viewing hours and several other network and local news shows. And with the trio of news magazines that are available. Additionally, some of the five offices involved disagreed with the Post in written comments in this survey. One said, for example:

> In my opinion the examination west is a dangerous newspaper. Since it is the only morning newspaper, it has too (word) discretion, thereby influencing many citizens. It is super ilbes'd, anti-pornsumu, and its destructive criticism method offers moments solutions for the real-world. I also regard its governments availability to by buying thousands of copies every morning for the various government offices, but I have no solution since it's the only local morning newspaper with adequate coverage, and I'm forced to read it myself the I above capitalize over the editorial page. I do much better at night with the site. (Five officer number 43)

On the other hand, this one got a universal opinion. One Modest said:

> I enjoy my daily Washington Post--I read it from cover to cover. I like the thorough coverage of world events in the Post. I constantly tend to express their editorial views and the Sunday centuries but I'm afflicted to appreciate the unpronounce twigs do observers can later maybe me cry to do better. (Five officer number 33)

To explore the possibility that certain journalistic practices were associated with an unfavorable attitude toward newspapers ultra-rite reporting, news suppliance on file certain items, a comparison was made between responses to the attitude statements and relevance that reporting watched daily or often, newspapers read often

or daily, and news magazines read regularly. Table 16 presents these data. It lends some support for the explanation that an aversion to the Washington Post influenced respondents to downgrade the "newspaper(s) read regularly" in comparison to "television news program(s) watched regularly" and "news magazine(s) read regularly."

Hypothesis 7 predicts that both groups believe other military services are more favored by the media than the Navy is. Table 17 presents data that strongly support this hypothesis, equally for both groups. Thirty-nine of 47 PAOs who rated a service as most favored by the media listed either the Air Force or the Marine Corps. Similarly, of 97 flag officers rating media favorability toward the services, 91 rated either the Air Force or the Marine Corps first. The Navy is, however, seen as more favored than the Army, so the hypothesis is not "absolutely" supported. Some of those who rated the Army in other than last place qualified their rating with a comment to the effect that they were interpreting "most favored" as meaning the one that had the most coverage. Thus the Army score, low as it is, may be inflated. The relatively large number of respondents who chose not to rate the services could be in agreement with one respondent who said:

> As to who gets the best press right now, that's like arguing relative rank among ensigns, or virtue among _____ /sic/. We're all painted black. (Flag officer number 23)

TABLE 16

AGREEMENT THAT NAVY NEWS TENDS TO BE FAIR AND UNBIASED, BY SPECIFIC NEWS SOURCES

	Percentage Admirals Agree	(N)	Percentage PAOs Agree	(N)
Evening TV News				
ABC	51	(19)	91	(11)
NBC	45	(49)	76	(29)
CBS	49	(45)	75	(36)
Newspapers				
Washington Post	32	(108)	82	(51)
Washington Daily News	29	(7)	71	(17)
Wall Street Journal	40	(76)	92	(12)
Washington Star	40	(68)	79	(38)
New York Times	42	(68)	77	(22)
Baltimore Sun	100	(2)	80	(5)
News Magazines				
Time	53	(70)	85	(34)
Newsweek	61	(43)	81	(31)
U. S. News and World Report	65	(43)	67	(18)

Note: Arranged in order from highest PAO/Admiral ratio to lowest, in each media category.

Respondents did not rate each program or publication specifically. "Agree" answers to "fair and unbiased" statements were analyzed by those that respondents indicated they regularly watched or read. As a result, the total number of cases is more than the number of respondents.

TABLE 17

MILITARY SERVICE MOST FAVORED BY THE MEDIA,
AS PERCEIVED BY ADMIRALS AND PAOs

	Admirals (N=97) Mean	PAOs (N=47) Mean
Air Force	2.4	2.3
Marine Corps	1.9	2.1
Navy	1.4	1.4
Army	.5	.2

Note: Three points were allotted for a first place ranking, two for second, one for third, none for last.

TABLE 17

MILITARY SERVICES MOST INVOLVED BY THE MEDICAL
TO RECEIVING OF BENEFITS FOR PTSD

	Malaria (DHCP)	PTSD (Kw17)
Age period	1.4	3.3
Routine Course	1.9	3.1
Navy	1.4	1.4
Army	.3	.3

Medical Claims policies were allocated due a close given
effective, the for example, one for child, some for less.

CHAPTER V

DISCUSSION

The results of this research generally support two major hypotheses--that Navy public affairs officers have more favorable attitudes toward the news media than Navy flag officers have, and that there are systematic distortions in the way each group perceives the other's attitudes. The concrete findings of the study have implications in several directions. This chapter discusses the findings in terms of their implications for Navy public affairs, for public relations and the news media in general, and for communications research.

Navy Public Affairs

Navy public relations was subordinated to the Office of Naval Intelligence until the beginning of World War II. The Navy's Office of Information was established to meet conditions prevalent during that war, most particularly: an organized, accredited and sometimes uniformed military press corps; a censorship program; total national mobilization in support of the war effort; and general popularity of the armed forces. The major news medium was the written press, backed up by radio and

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

The theories of this research generally support two major hypotheses--that Navy public affairs officers have more favorable attitudes toward the news media than Navy line officers have, and that there are systematic differences in the way each group perceives the other's attitudes. The concerns findings of the study have implications in several directions. This chapter discusses the findings in terms of their implications for Navy public affairs, the public relations and the news media in general, and for communications research.

Navy Public Affairs

Navy public relations was substantially to the office of Naval Intelligence until the beginning of World War II. The Navy's office of Information was established to meet conditions prevalent during that war, some particularly an ocean-based, aggressive and expansive wartime military press center; a monumentally problem naval personnel mobilization in support of the war effort and general popularity of the armed forces. The motion news media was the written press, bound up in radio and

newsreels. The general philosophy of public relations was that publicity is the pathway to public support. None of these conditions is the same thirty years later.

The public affairs specialty in the Navy was established after World War II in the context of wartime experience. This group of fewer than a hundred officers included many ex-newsmen. The public information program and the specialists who manned it were viewed by top Navy management primarily as tools for achieving public support at a time when competition between services for a reduced military budget was intense. The Navy's public relations program shrank after World War II, expanded during the Korean fighting, contracted again after Korea, was enlarged as American involvement in Vietnam increased in the mid-1960's, and by 1970 was shrinking again. The scope of public relations activities has been associated more with the needs and interest of the news media during wartime than with the Navy's organizational goals--which would logically call for more public relations activity when there is not a natural public interest in the military.

Perhaps one reason that Navy public relations activities have not always logically pursued organizational goals is the traditional low priority assigned to public relations by professional military men, and their distinct disinclination to become involved in the public information process. This study demonstrates that present Navy leaders

have definite attitudes toward the media. Seemingly, news media coverage of the Navy is salient enough to be considered a high priority concern of the service's management. Yet the group of specialists dealing with public affairs is still small. It is subordinated and out of the main stream of the Navy's officer corps. Its attitudes are either unknown or misread by many flag officers. Quite probably it is impotent in its ability to influence management decisions in many cases. Since such differences in attitudes toward the news media and perceptions of those attitudes exist between Admirals and PAOs, an observer is forced to comment about both the "attitude gap" and the "communications gap" within the organization, and how these may affect Navy public relations.

It is quite possible that these gaps result from the personnel structure of the Navy. Flag officers are the select elite chosen to lead others. They are the cream of the crop, representing long years of experience and the positive traditions of the Navy, including the tradition of non-involvement in public affairs activity. They are dedicated to their service and to their country. Public affairs officers, while not prohibited from having one of their number become a flag officer, have never had an Admiral. A description of the information specialty in the Navy (Larson, in progress) shows that specialists were at first considered a marginal group in the Navy, where they

performed work not directly related to operating ships or aircraft at sea. Larson's research indicates a trend in the Navy toward greater appreciation for the public affairs function and less criticism of the specialist group in the 1960's. The older patterns of thought remain, however, as the Navy's organization shows. That information duty, even of a non-specialist nature, is a kiss of death to the career ambitions of a naval officer is illustrated by the present study's findings that only 13 per cent of the flag officer respondents had ever served in public affairs billets. Some of these started at the top, after becoming Admirals, with assignment as Chief of Information. All the Chiefs of Information of the Navy Department have been either aviators, submariners or surface line officers. The Navy has, in its personnel system, effectively concluded that--at the top--public relations is too important to be left to public relations specialists, while down the line it is too unimportant to require uniformly outstanding performance. This gives special meaning to a comment by one Admiral respondent:

> Navy Public Affairs officers are uniformly incompetent. They are failures as naval officers who are attracted to the supposed glamor of association with big names. My personal experience in working with PAOs has been that they have, when accompanying me to monitor a meeting with the media, been utterly useless, and in many cases a detriment to the effort, butting in, trying to aggrandize themselves, etc., doing everything but something useful. I can't say much more for the caliber of the average reporter I have worked with. (Flag officer number 88)

performed when not directly related to sporting ability can
subsist on her. Dickson's remarkable initiative & energy in
the army induced marked commendation from the public authorities
Dennison and some politicians of the Republican party in the
1860's. The older practices of violence remain, however, in
the army's organization scheme. Some disciplinary duty, even
of a non-commissioned nature, is a task set daily to the
general population of a naval station is illustrated by the
General Assembly's direction that only 11 per cent of the City
citizen temperaments has been barred in public schools
initiative. Some of these observed at the top. After passing
Admiral's, which recognized as chief of Education. All the
Chiefs of Tuberculin of the City Commissioner have been
other activity, administrative or service like officers. The
duty has. In the personnel system, effectively regulated
free--as the top-public relations is too important to be
left to public relations specialists, while keep the line
in the subcommittee to receive and properly understanding
procedures. This gives special training to a consumer in
one Mercurit employment.

Many public figures critical and judiciary investigations.
They are failures to avoid efficacy who are motivated
by the supposed climate of treatment with full time.
By personal experiences in working with those who have
more duty here, when encouraging be to monitor a
meeting with the public, been utterly useless, and in
many cases a duplicate to the other. Putting in
trying to duplicate themselves, etc., doing everything
but somewhere needed. I can't say much more for the
caliber of the service because I have worked with.
(2)No office number (3)

Actually, the results of this study lend some support for a belief that Admirals have more faith in PAOs as standard naval officers than is warranted. Flag officers clearly believe that information officer attitudes toward the media are much closer to the Admirals' own attitudes than they really are. This finding downgrades the typical public relations man's complaint that management does not support the PAO because it thinks he is "on the newsman's side." The PAOs are a lot more favorable to newsmen than management knows, probably because they have carefully concealed their empathy with the media from a management that they in turn view as being more hostile to the media than it really is. Whether closing this communications gap would have a salutory affect on Navy public relations or not is debatable.

As for the attitude gap, there are two approaches. One is to assume that the gap should be closed: that Admirals and PAOs should have similar attitudes toward the news media. The other is to argue that the attitude difference is natural and needs no rectification. If we adopt the former approach, it is clear that there must be more communication between the two groups, and that this communication must be doubly successful; more accurate cross-perception must develop, and attitudes must change. If we accept the status quo of the latter approach, we are saying that both groups have attitudes toward the media

Formally, the results of this study have shown support for a belief that Mexicans have more faith in their advanced level offices than is warranted. That citizens clearly believe that information, office structure control the media are much closer to the Mexicans' own attitudes than they really are. This finding confirms the typical public relations man's complaint that newspapers chose not anymore the PRO because it claims he is "on the newsman's side." The PROs are a lot more important to newsmen than newspapers normally because they have generally convinced their employer with the media than a accomplishment that they in turn view as being more hostile to the media than it really is. Theories viewing this communications gap would have a relatively silent on many positive relations or not is doubtful.

As for the attitude gap, there are two approaches. One is to assume that the gap should be closed; that Mexicans and PROs should have similar attitudes toward the news media. The other is to accept that the attitude difference is natural and needs no rectification. If we adopt the former approach, it is clear that there must be more communication between the two groups, and that this communication must be directly exchange; more accurate cross-perception must develop, and attitudes must change. If we accept the existence and to its latter approach, we are saying that both groups have attitudes toward the media

that will benefit the Navy in the long run: PAOs who work with the media understand media problems and should have more favorable attitudes toward the media than management.

In either case, there is reason to believe that the Navy's public relations personnel structure and policy does not do justice to the importance of public support to the Navy. Flag officer attitudes and comments indicate that they are concerned about the effect the news media have on public attitudes toward the Navy. The question is whether they connect this concern with Knorr's (1970) position that public support is a component of the actual military power of a nation. These are some of the flag officer comments:

> I believe we need more aggressive news proffering to media about the Navy--to tell our story! (Flag officer number 8)
>
> The Navy should get more aggressive about responding to biased, shaded or emotional reports and articles. (Flag officer number 121)
>
> News media need and must have Navy assistance in achieving truly objective reporting of Navy news. Without it, they will tend to misinterpret, and create their own slants. (Flag officer number 19)
>
> We need a professionally competent Navy public affairs group about as badly as we need a more responsible public press. It's not all bad, but there is much room for improvement in both. (Flag officer number 24)

The comparative intensity of management's attitudes toward the news media indicates real concern for the media's product and its affect on the Navy's public support. Management probably does recognize the importance of public support as a component of military capacity in the United

States, perhaps more so than its public relations staff. But the organization has not demonstrated a commitment to use its best people in the small group of specialists that is supposed to work toward maximizing public support for the Navy, or as sub-specialists who receive training in public relations by postgraduate education or learn in public affairs assignments. Most outstanding senior line officers of the present, those who are Admirals, have not held public affairs assignments during their careers. This gives little reason to believe that potentially outstanding officers are seeking or being assigned to public affairs work, either as sub-specialists or transfers to the specialist group.

It is difficult to equate the flag officers' apparent concern for public relations with the Navy's failure to take more positive action to encourage its best people to work in this area. What seems to be called for is an organizational recognition of the importance to the country's actual military strength of public support. This should be backed by a conscious effort to provide a motivated, top-notch corps of public affairs specialists and to assign line officer standouts to public affairs work as a normal and important part of their career development.

In summary, the implications for Navy public affairs from this study are as follows: Navy management and public relations staff attitudes toward the news media

are well apart. Flag officers have had little experience with full-time public relations work and may have marginal respect for people who work in the communications field. Management and public relations staff do not communicate well enough to have accurate perceptions of each other's attitudes toward the news media. Considering the "attitude gap," this "communications gap" may not be so bad for Navy information specialists--who might find their jobs harder if management realized how out-of-step PAO attitudes are on this subject. But it seems that, whatever the risk for this group, increased accuracy would be a worthwhile goal of internal communication--whether or not one deems that increased agreement is also. If each group communicated its values and rationale to the other group better, it is quite possible that attitudes would become more homogeneous, and that the Navy's effectiveness with the news media might be enhanced. An alternate possibility is that the difference in attitudes is natural because each group has its own organizational role to fill, and that the Navy functions better with each holding firmly to its own attitudes. If that is the case, the relative size, quality and authority of the groups leave no doubt about one thing: when decision-making time comes in the Navy, flag officers are in charge, and their attitudes toward the news media are the ones that will prevail. Those attitudes, even if they are correct and proper, are hardly likely to improve

the Navy's relations with the news media.

Public Relations and the News Media

The findings of this study are in accord with Cutlip and Center's view that the public relations practitioner is the man in the middle in press relations. Organizations want news reported in a manner that will promote their objectives and not cause trouble, while newsmen want stories that will interest readers and viewers. Executives, generally, whether in industry or government, have complaints against the news media. Media representatives often have counter-complaints.

Said one of the information officer respondents in the survey:

> It appears to me that throughout Navy Public Affairs, our officers and enlisted are losing whatever identification or sympathy they may have had at one time with or for the working newsman. He is usually "the other side," hence our defensive public affairs operation. . . . Add this to the fact that most flag officers, because of their longtime insulation from the action and interaction of civilian society, do not appreciate PA problems nor understand them, and therein lies the roots of most of the Navy's problems with the press and with public attitudes. (PAO number 26)

Another obvious implication of the study is that the Navy has incorporated professional public relations practitioners within its structure. These are public relations specialists, not just naval officers who happened to be assigned to work with the media. They constitute a public relations staff with distinct attitudes and functions,

as well as loyalty to the organization. In general, public relations staffs have some handicaps that come from being a part of the organization, rather than experts from an outside counseling agency. The staff man has the advantage of team membership, but an everpresent subordinate role leads to the danger of his becoming a "yes" man. As we have seen, Navy public relations staff men's attitudes toward the media are incorrectly perceived by management, quite possibly because the PR men have tended to be conciliatory in their communications up the line in the organization. Despite this lack of objectivity handicap, there are distinct advantages that go along with team membership. Certainly the public relations staff man in the Navy is valuable because he has inside knowledge of the military and his service. As a result he can serve the news media and his organization better.

Another implication of the study is that service to the public via the news media is of prime concern to Navy information officers. In this sense, they are part of a special breed of practitioners of public relations, those in government service. While they are devoted to the goals of their organization and government, they see their function as complementary to the news media, not antagonistic. Their favorability toward the media is so pronounced that it raises some questions about the theory that government-media relationships are characterized by "adversarity"

(Rivers, 1970). If we take the attitudes of the management level in this survey, we find attitudes that may be considered hostile to the media, although not necessarily more hostile than those of comparable segments of the American civilian population. But the Navy public affairs officers' attitudes show no support for the hypothesis that they view the media as an adversary. A much better characterization of the newsman/government public relations man relationship than adversarity, it seems, is what Nimmo calls "facilitation." Government organizations, the Navy being one example, are so large and so complex that news about them cannot be collected with ease by any external newsgathering organization. Public relations men, working as agents for newsmen, are able to facilitate news coverage of the government. The fact that public relations practitioners have a loyalty to their organizations and a basic commitment to serve them rather than the newsgathering organizations is really one of value placement. Obviously, government public relations officials feel that their organizations are necessary institutions serving in the public interest. The news media, too, are necessary institutions serving in the public interest. There need not be great adversarity if both sets of institutions, government and media, are performing well. When the complete scope of government-media relations is examined, it appears that cooperation and facilitation emerge as the key elements,

not adversarity. But just as bad news often receives the attention of the media, and bad media reporting often gains the attention of those in government, irregularities in government-media relations (the cases in which adversarity is the key element) often receive a disproportionate amount of attention from those who examine these relationships. The implication of this study is that the public relations practitioner has a valid, useful purpose in government. His attitudes provide a bridge between the management of the organization and newsmen. If he does his job properly he serves the public, his organization and the media--probably in that order of priority. It seems that a mature concept of public relations, in whatever organizational setting, calls for the same from the individuals who are practitioners.

As for the news media, the study clearly demonstrates that Navy Admirals are not overwhelmed with pleasure about the treatment their service has been receiving in the news department. It shows, too, that if newsmen have a friend in the Navy, it is likely to be the public affairs officer. The implication is that news industry spokesmen who decry the practice of public relations in the military are ill-advised. It would seem more to their advantage to support the public affairs specialists as necessary cogs in the process of mass communication. Certainly, the answer to getting more information about the

military to the public does not lie in dismantling military public information efforts.

Furthermore, data from opinion polls such as those cited in Chapter II, when compared with the responses of flag officers and information officers, lead to some observations about their attitudes that may not fit some stereotypes held by the media. One observation is that flag officers are not very different from the general public in their attitudes toward the news. If we consider the fact that the Admirals are highly educated (at least 57 bachelor's degrees, 55 masters, two PhDs, four law and seven medical degrees were reported), that they are generally well informed, and that they have a great deal of personal knowledge of news events which involve the Navy, we recognize that their apparent hostility to the media is not an isolated phenomenon, but rather the same sort of response a researcher would probably get if he asked college presidents what they thought about media coverage of their universities, politicians what they thought of news about campaigns, bank presidents what they thought of economic news reporting, or student leaders for their opinions about news coverage of the campus. There is little reason to believe that the majority of flag officers would agree with the majority of American respondents who indicated in the CBS poll that they would favor restriction of press freedom under some circumstances. The flag

officer attitudes, then, are neither a surprise nor the vented frustrations of an isolated minority. They are rather typical attitudes to be expected from Americans in similar social roles. The anomaly, if there is one, is the homogeneous nature of the favorable attitudes held by public affairs officers toward the new function. Here, too, we have a rather highly educated group (50 of the 51 have college degrees, and 15 hold the master's), one that is well informed, and knows a lot about Navy events that make news. The easy explanation is that PAOs feel a sort of empathy with newsmen--after all, communication is their professional specialty in the Navy. Also, while they know a great deal about the Navy side of news stories, they are also knowledgeable about the newsmen's problems and the complicated process of news reporting.

The fact remains, however, that most of the top management of the Navy--which may be typical of other elite groups in American society--is not very satisfied with the job being done by the news media. Yet the responses of the Admirals ranged from being as unfavorable as possible on the eight measuring statements to being as favorable as possible. It is important that we disaggregate individuals and illustrate that all shades of attitudes are represented by the group score, as these indicate:

> In my opinion, news media isn't as biased against us as we seem to think. (Flag officer number 18)
>
> . . . some papers (and other media) are fair, some are

> not. Some slant news to an unacceptable degree. Some editorial pages are unfair, even venal and vicious. Some try very hard to be objective. (Flag officer number 20)
>
> We tend to blame the press rather than ourselves when an unfavorable event is reported. (Flag officer number 96)
>
> Re Navy coverage. We could do a lot worse, and I think we've been rather fortunate. When we continue to make boo-boos, why complain? (Flag officer number 114)

Quite often, comments volunteered by the flag officers were critical of certain aspects such as commercialism or access, as these show:

> I believe that most news media are primarily interested in selling a product. As a result many unimportant events and people get unwarranted attention by the press and in many instances the reporting fails to be factual or concise or accurate. This may be partially due to the need to fill time or space but the major reason is to sell a product. (Flag officer number 106)
>
> I feel the Navy could and should submit reclama's or rebuttals to those articles that sometimes give a biased or unfair story about the Navy. I also feel the press could and should print the rebuttals as prominently in the paper as the articles they refute. For example--the Navy carriers took a severe beating in the press last fall. The Navy placed in the Congressional Record a factual story about the aircraft carrier that refuted most of the charges made in the press (and congress). This Navy rebuttal never got published in any newspaper--to my knowledge. (Flag officer number 69)

Interestingly enough, in light of Wiggins's thesis that the conflict between military secrecy and press freedom is at the root of problems between the military and the media, only one of the flag officers stressed a concern about secrecy. He said:

> Having been in security & intelligence field for . . . years, I have developed an unfavorable opinion of news

> media reps integrity and their ability to act in the interest of the U. S. There have been a few exceptions encountered, but majority have convinced me they will do almost anything for a name and a buck. (Flag officer number 112)

Some respondents lined up with Vice President Agnew, as did these:

> In my view, V. P. Agnew was entirely correct in his assessment of the media--and the media reaction to his view was uniquely revealing of their inbred self-serving attitude. (Flag officer number 89)

> The trend in television news analysis took a real sharp change after Spiro lowered the boom. If Agnew doesn't keep quiet, he's going to talk himself right into the White House! (PAO number 22)

Other comments reveal additional concerns, many of which were about intentional or unintentional bias in the news and the general performance of the media. Here are some of those:

> Although I won't accuse the media of being wilfully unfair and biased . . . I do believe that newsmen (this includes TV, Radio, etc.) in general and reporters in particular are superficial, prone to error or preconceived misinterpretation and generally inclined to manufacture news or embellish it. My worry is that they lack the sensitivity to realize this automatically works to make their product biased or unfair when their intentions are not deliberate to do this. We need less aggressive and more responsible performance from these people. (Flag officer number 58)

> The most general complaints I have personally about newspaper/TV reporting are: (1) the tendency to editorialize in supposedly pure reporting, and (2) less than desired thoroughness in research, particularly in technical and professional areas, on the part of reporters. I frankly attribute the latter to a less than appropriate sense of responsibility for what they are saying on the part of a good many reporters. You might call it laziness. (Flag officer number 8)

> The news media generally "oomment" on the news, and

> "editorialize"--slanting news reporting to their views --rather than reporting the news and reporting "all views." (Flag officer number 98)
>
> I am concerned about the scarcity of honest, unbiased news reporting--press or TV. Everybody tends to have "an angle." (Flag officer number 76)
>
> When one reads the occasional news story to which he is privy--and notes the lack of accuracy--he wonders why read newspapers, or listen to radio/TV. Yet you can't shut off the need because (it is) important. (Flag officer number 48)
>
> TV and the visual-verbal impact of selective news reporting is . . . highly volatile. . . . A high order of intellectual honesty and close top management monitoring and supervision (industry not govt.) is required to assure an objective presentation. . . . (Flag officer number 111)
>
> The news media have become the judge and jury for public affairs, defense policy, domestic policy and foreign policy. (Flag officer number 122)

These negative comments should not be taken as the sputterings of individuals who feel threatened by the media. They actually repeat many of the themes of responsible critics of the news industry. For the most part, they call on the media to improve its performance: something the media has frequently asked of the military. Some journalists may consider the attitudes of the flag officers a compliment. Their pens have drawn blood. Yet they have drawn it with attacks their victims consider irresponsible under rules that allow for no retaliation. Certainly, the sword is virtually useless against the pen in the United States, no matter what the holder of the sword thinks of those who wield the pen.

"Universal"--directing news reporting to their views
--without ever reporting the news and reporting "all
views." (Fly officer number 34)

I am concerned about the security of power, unless
news reporting--press or TV. Everybody needs to have
"an angle." (Fly officer number 76)

When one reads the commercial news story to which he is
privy--and notes the lack of accuracy--he wonders why
used newspapers, or lights to radio/TV. Yet you can't
shut off the need because (it is) important. (Fly
officer number 44)

TV and the visual-verbal impact of alternative news
reporting is . . . highly volatile. . . . A high order
of intellectual honesty and clean top management
control[s] and supervision (industry not ours.) is
required to execute an objective presentation. . . .
(Fly officer number 111)

The news media have become the judge and jury for
public attacks, defense policy, domestic policy and
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moral claims of those who wield the pen.

Communications Research

This study put the coorientational model to the test in a group situation. The model was more useful than originally anticipated. Foremost, from a methodological point of view, it directed the researcher to measure respondents' attitudes and compare them with other attitudes and perceptions of others' attitudes without explaining--and probably biasing--the research project. The technique merits further application in organizational studies. Also, the model permitted the researcher to measure and compare group characteristics in a meaningful way. Chaffee and McLeod's model was intended to describe dyadic communication situations between two individuals, such as parent and child. This study applied the coorientation model to two groups, and used a check of the reification assumption to determine whether one group was seen as a generalized entity by the other group. The check showed that "flag officer," as a reification, is a real "thing" for almost all public affairs officers. In some cases, public affairs officers were more likely to visualize the generalized flag officers as agreeing or disagreeing in their attitude toward a statement about the news media than to see themselves as agreeing or disagreeing. To them, a generalized flag officer was apparently not much more difficult to conceptualize than a generalized own personality. On the other hand, "public affairs officer" is not

Conversations Transcript

This study put the conversational model to the test in a group situation. The model was more useful than originally anticipated. However, from a methodological point of view, it proved the researcher to examine respondents' motivations and acquaintance time with other participants' utterances written explaining--not primarily interesting research project. The technique merits further application in organizational studies. Also, the model permitted the researcher to examine and compare group characteristics in a meaningful way. Dunlop and Mednick's model was intended to describe dyadic communication situations between two individuals, such as parent and child. This study applied the conversation model to one person, and used a check of the relationship assumptions to determine whether one group was seen by a personality entity by the other group. The check showed that "lay officer," as a definition, is a good "plug" for almost all public affairs officers. In some cases, public affairs officers were more likely to characterize the generalized lay officers by expressing or disagreeing in their opinions toward a statement about the news media than to map themselves as opposing or disagreeing. In fact, a generalized lay officer was apparently not much more difficult to accommodate than a generalized own personality. On the other hand, "public affairs officer" is not

an easy reification for Admirals. It may be argued that the study stretches the model too much because of the reification problem. Actually, though, the very fact that flag officers found public affairs officers difficult to stereotype in their thinking (as they also found "most reporters" a difficult reification) is important to the interpretations of the study. It illustrates an organizational separation between management and public relations staff, and leads to an assumption that top management in the Navy--for various valid reasons--is either not aware of and acquainted with its public relations specialists, or else considers their activities and attitudes to have relatively low priority. Thus the coorientational model proved very useful even at this point of vulnerability.

Did the reification problem affect the validity of the empirical data gathered by the study? To a certain extent it did. If the research had failed to show such clear results, acceptance of the findings might be challenged. But there is so little ambiguity in the data that greater precision of measurement is not required. What the coorientational model attempts to do, after all, is take a lot of the impressionistic guess-work out of research and point toward the reality of the social situation. It certainly does that in this study. As a framework for research, it provides better data than an open-ended unschematic approach could possibly generate, permitting

the study to focus on its objectives and to incorporate a convenient rating scale approach to measurement.

This study did not use the coorientation model as it was originally intended, that is, to evaluate the communication variable in a social situation. For other researchers using the model, some important methodological considerations must be faced. One is the difficulty of observing communication. A second is the nature of the person-to-person relationship of individuals in a coorientational situation. A third, when group study is undertaken, is measurement of one group's attitudes toward the other group--is there like or dislike, respect or lack of respect, etc. There was almost no way to obtain reliable information about the amount or type of communication between flag officers and public affairs officers. Nor was the amount and type of interpersonal communication a particularly relevant measure for this study, which merely sought to establish the direction of group attitudes toward the media and the differences in group perceptions of the other group's attitudes. Flag officer-public affairs officer relationships in Washington are not, as a rule, on a one-to-one basis. Thus, no study of pairs was contemplated. Such pairing might be interesting, but it would of necessity be a limited examination of Admirals and their personal staff public affairs officers. It seems sufficient to consider flag officers and PAOs as interchangeable

individual units in the Navy's organizational bureaucracy. Their role relationships are determined by their place in the Navy's structure. Any given information officer in the survey may have worked closely with an Admiral or Admirals either in Washington or elsewhere, or that if he has not, he is well aware of the probability that he will. Flag officers in Washington may have had public affairs officers working for or with them in sea or shore assignments. If not, they no doubt know that they are likely to have a staff PAO in the future. The organizational role relationship and the coorientation model make the results of this study generalizable, and offer the prospect of a follow-on replication over time. This prospect is particularly inviting since the news environment of the present study indicates that attitudes of the respondents may have been influenced by pronouncements of high government officials and Navy leaders, by controversy about news reporting that was covered with at least adequate emphasis by the media, and by an international and national climate of bad news for the military. One might hypothesize that at other times, with different spokesmen, muted controversy, or an improved news situation, some attitudes toward the media held by these two groups would change--or that new attitudes would replace old as the composition of the groups changed. Such a hypothesis suggests a test of two commonly accepted assumptions of journalism: (1) that criticism of the news

media by leaders causes government organizations to hold negative attitudes and/or take restrictive action against the media; or, conversely, that less criticism of the media by government leaders would cause government officials to take more favorable attitudes toward the media; (2) that unfavorable attitudes toward the media develop when the news is unpleasant; or, officials would be more favorable to the media if the news were not so bad. We often hear these two assumptions repeated as part of journalism's folklore--especially the latter, usually couched in a "beheading the messenger" analogy--but they deserve rigorous examination.

Thanks to work by Chaffee and McLeod and others, this study's findings about Admirals' and PAOs' attitudes can be considered in relationship to the results of other coorientational research. Much previous work has indicated that greater communication is correlated with greater agreement, accuracy and congruency. But if we assume this for flag officers and information officers, we are on the pathway to the assumption that persuasive communication changes attitudes in proportion to the amount of communication processed. While it is fashionable to call for more dialogue to resolve differences of opinion, this "more communication, more consensus" assumption is not automatically acceptable, enticing as it may be to a communicator. Testing this in the Admiral-PAO-media context would require

another study with other measures. A researcher could select Admiral-PAO pairs, determine their attitudes, measure in some way their interpersonal communication, and find out how much like/dislike, respect/lack of respect, etc., exists, and draw some conclusions. Designing and obtaining cooperation for such a study would be extremely difficult, however. Until meaningful research of this nature is undertaken, we are left with but one way to apply theory to the real situation. That is to take the findings of other coorientational studies in communications and generalize from these to the Navy situation that is known to exist as a result of this study.

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY

This chapter tells how and why the study was designed, then summarizes its findings and the implications derived from the research.

The study consisted of a survey of Navy flag officers (Rear Admirals, Vice Admirals and Admirals) and Navy public affairs specialists in Washington, D. C., in early 1970. A self-administered anonymous questionnaire was completed by 125 Admirals (89 per cent of the survey population) and by 51 PAOs (93 per cent response rate). The aim of the research was to determine the comparative attitudes of these two groups toward the news media of mass communications. The attitudes of these individuals are salient to any understanding of Navy public information policy; they are top management and public relations staff in the Navy's organizational bureaucracy.

A research design based on Chaffee and McLeod's coorientation model provided quantified measures of attitudes toward the media held by each group, as well as measures of the perceptions of the other group's attitudes. Favorability or unfavorability toward the media was

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY

This chapter will now end the study was
completed, then summarizes its findings and the implications
derived from the research.

The study consisted of a survey of Army (Air
officers (Base Commanders, Vice Wonleaders and Wonleaders) and
Army public affairs specialists in Washington, D. C., in
early 1970. A multi-dimensional nonparametric quantitative
was completed by 113 Officers (80 per cent of the entire
population) and 31 PAOs (81 per cent response rate).
The aim of the research was to determine the compatibility
existence of three two groups toward the news media of mass
communications. The principle of three implications are
relative to any understanding of Army public information
policy; they are: Job assignment and public relations within
the Army's organizational hierarchy.

A research design based on Chaffee and Mcleod's
communication model provided operational measures of
attitude toward the media held by each group. An oval is
measure of the performance of the other group's attitude.
Compatibility is unidimensionality toward the media was

measured by eight statement items to which respondents could agree or disagree or decline to give an opinion. Information sources were identified and compared, and primary sources were compared with attitudes toward specific types of media. Attitude agreement, accuracy of perception, and congruency (perceived agreement) were measured and compared. Respondents were asked to rate the military services on the basis of which was, in their opinion, most favored by the news media.

Public affairs officers reported themselves to be generally more frequent users than flag officers of newspapers, television, radio and news magazines, but not of professional and military-oriented periodicals. Both Admirals and information officers seemed to rely more on newspapers than on other media.

Attitudes toward the news media held by information officers were dramatically more favorable than flag officer attitudes toward the media. Favorability and unfavorability were not related to either variety or quantity of media use, to educational level, or to Admirals' having served in public affairs billets at some time during their careers. Public affairs officers of Commander rank were closer than those of other PAO ranks to flag officers in attitudes toward the media. Even so, there was a statistically significant difference between the attitudes of the Commander group and the Admirals. Service college attendance

tended to correlate with a more favorable attitude toward the media among flag officers, as did experience in surface ships as opposed to duty in submarines, staff or special duty, or naval aviation. These differences were not statistically significant, and the degree of favorability seemed almost completely unrelated to other partialing variables: length of time as a flag officer and source of commission. Public affairs officers with more than four years' experience as PAOs tended to be less favorable to the media than those with four years or fewer, but the difference was not statistically significant.

Admirals were less accurate in predicting public affairs officer attitudes toward the news media than information officers were in predicting Admirals' attitudes. The information officers had a concept of "generalized flag officers" and were willing to predict attitudes on the basis of that reification. Visualizing the attitudes of "generalized public affairs officers" was more difficult for flag officers. Flag officers perceived greater agreement between their attitudes and PAO attitudes than vice versa. Public affairs specialists thought flag officers were less favorable toward the news media than they actually were. Admirals thought PAOs were less favorable to the news media than they actually were.

Overall, both groups were more favorable toward newspapers and news magazines than toward television news.

However, most flag officers thought newspapers they regularly read were more biased and unfair in their coverage of Navy news than television news programs they regularly watched or news magazines they regularly read. Both groups felt the Air Force and Marine Corps were more favored by the news media than the Navy, but rated the Navy's treatment as better than the Army's.

There were implications from the study for communications research, for Navy public affairs, and public relations and the news media in general.

The research project showed that the coorientation model was useful and valid for a group study, especially since the results of the study could be interpreted in the light of previous coorientational research in communications.

The fact that there was an "attitude gap" and a "communications gap" between top management and the public relations staff of the Navy implies some problems for Navy public affairs. The attitude gap--a striking difference between PAO and flag officer attitudes toward the news media--indicates that there is an organizational difference between these two groups that is so strong it dictates different attitude patterns. A basic difference in role functions is apparently the primary reason for the attitude differences. They may also be partly a result of the Navy's personnel system, which has not encouraged the development

of a highly motivated public affairs specialist corps or assigned outstanding line officers to full-time public affairs tours with regularity. The communications gap--a misreading of attitudes of the other group by both Admirals and PAOs--indicates that organizational factors distort interpersonal communications between the groups. Conciliatory communication by the information officers to the Admirals left the impression that they are not as favorable toward the media as they really were; emphasis on unpleasant reactions to the media in the Admirals' communications to the PAOs made the information officers think the Admirals were more hostile to the media than they actually were. These gaps imply some dysfunction in the Navy, since those who make decisions about Navy information policy (the Admirals) have harsher attitudes toward the media than the technical public relations specialists who do most of the dealing with the media--and each group misinterprets the attitudes of the other. A continued combination of these factors is unlikely to enhance Navy relations with the news media or contribute to increased public support, a necessary component of the actual military strength of the United States.

Implications for public relations and for the news media in general from the study are primarily twofold: (1) The study reaffirms Cutlip and Center's observation that the public relations man is the man in the middle in

press relations. The Navy PAOs are mediators between management and newsmen, and their attitudes imply that they are intent on building bridges between the two.

(2) Although flag officer attitudes are not necessarily more hostile to the media than could be expected from individuals in similar civilian social roles, the favorability of the public relations practitioners of the Navy toward the media is homogeneous and quite high in a comparative sense. This should be a signal to the media that this particular public relations group wants to serve the public via the news media. The government-media relationship in this case is more properly described as one of facilitation and cooperation than one of adversarity, at least from the public relations man's viewpoint. It is possible to generalize that public relations staffs in other organizations, especially government, can be facilitating links--bridges, not roadblocks--serving the public in cooperation with the mass media of communications.

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APPENDIXES

APPENDIX A

TEXT OF QUESTIONNAIRES

SURVEY OF FLAG OFFICER ATTITUDES TOWARD THE MEDIA

(Note: PAO questionnaire was titled "Survey of Public Affairs Officer Attitudes," etc. Text of the two questionnaires was the same, except as noted.)

Note: This is an anonymous questionnaire. The answers are only to be used in a statistical analysis. Nothing will be connected with your name. Returned questionnaires will be destroyed after analysis. There is a space for your comments at the end of the questionnaire. The success of this study depends upon complete responses from everyone.

1. What daily television news programs do you watch, and how regularly?

	never	rarely	often	daily
WMAL-ABC-Channel 7				
ABC Evening News (Frank Reynolds)	____	____	____	____
WRC-NBC-Channel 4				
Today Show	____	____	____	____
The Huntley-Brinkly Report	____	____	____	____
WTOP-CBS-Channel 9				
CBS Morning News (Joseph Benti)	____	____	____	____
CBS Evening News (Walter Cronkite	____	____	____	____
Others (please specify):				
_____	____	____	____	____
_____	____	____	____	____

APPENDIX A

TEXT OF QUESTIONNAIRES

SURVEY OF BIG CITIES' MAYORS AMONG THE MEDIA

(Note: 2nd questionnaire was titled "Survey of Public Affairs Officer Activities," etc. Text of the two questionnaires was the same, except as noted.)

Note: This is an anonymous questionnaire. The answers are only to be used in a statistical analysis. Nothing will be connected with your name. Returned questionnaires will be destroyed after analysis. There is a space for your comments at the end of the questionnaire. The success of this study depends upon complete responses from everyone.

1. What daily television news programs do you watch, and how regularly?

	Never	Rarely	Often	Daily
Radio-ABC-Channel 7				
ABC Evening News (Frank Reynolds)	____	____	____	____
NBC-TVC-Channel 4				
Today Show	____	____	____	____
The Nightly Business Report	____	____	____	____
WJLA-CBS-Channel 9				
CBS Morning News (Joseph Benti)	____	____	____	____
CBS Evening News (Walter Cronkite	____	____	____	____
Others (please specify):				
_____	____	____	____	____
_____	____	____	____	____

2. What radio news reports do you hear, and how regularly?

	never	rarely	often	daily
WMAL (American)	____	____	____	____
WRC (NBC)	____	____	____	____
WTOP (CBS)	____	____	____	____
Others--for example, WAVA, WDON, WEAM, WEEL, WFAX, WGMS, WHMC, WHRN, WINX, WLMD, WOL, WOOK, WPGC, WPIX, WGMR, WUST, or WWDC (please specify):				
_____	____	____	____	____
_____	____	____	____	____

3. What daily newspapers do you read, and how regularly?

Baltimore Sun	____	____	____	____
New York Times	____	____	____	____
Wall Street Journal	____	____	____	____
Washington Daily News	____	____	____	____
Washington Post	____	____	____	____
Washington Star	____	____	____	____
Others (please specify):	____	____	____	____
_____	____	____	____	____
_____	____	____	____	____

4. Please check the weekly news magazine(s) you regularly read, if any.

_____Newsweek _____Time _____U.S. News & World Report

5. Please check any of these publications which you regularly read.

____All Hands ____Armed Forces Journal ____Atlantic

____Armed Forces Management ____Aviation Week & Space Technology

____Business Week ____Commanders Digest ____Direction

2. What radio news reports do you hear, and how regularly?

	Hear Usually	Often	Rarely	Never
WGAY (American)	____	____	____	____
BBC (BBC)	____	____	____	____
RADA (CBA)	____	____	____	____
Others--(for example, WJAY, WCOA, WCAM, WRAL, WRAL, WBBM, WGBH, WGBG, WGBX, WJAG, WJAG, WCR, WJAX, WJAG, WBZX, WBAK, WCAU, WCAU, or WBBC (please specify):				
_____	____	____	____	____
_____	____	____	____	____

3. What daily newspapers do you read, and how regularly

Baltimore Sun	____	____	____	____
New York Times	____	____	____	____
Wall Street Journal	____	____	____	____
Washington Daily News	____	____	____	____
Washington Post	____	____	____	____
Washington Star	____	____	____	____
Others (please specify):	____	____	____	____
_____	____	____	____	____
_____	____	____	____	____

4. Please check the weekly news magazine(s) you regularly read, if any.

_____Newsweek _____Time _____U.S. News & World Report

5. Please check any of these publications which you regularly read.

____All Hands ____Naval Proceedings ____Military Review

____Naval Forces Management ____Military Week & Space Technology

____Defense News ____Commanders Digest ____Diversion

____Defense Dept. press clippings ____Fortune

____Harpers ____Life ____Look ____Navy, the Magazine of Seapower

____Navy Times ____National Geographic

____Naval Aviation News ____Naval Institute Proceedings

____Playboy ____TV Guide ____Readers Digest

____Undersea Technology

Please list other such publications you regularly read:

_____ _____

_____ _____

_____ _____

6. How often do you hear a "press briefing"?

____never ____rarely ____often ____daily

7. Here are some statements about television, radio, newspapers and magazines; about the people who are associated with them; and about their content--in other words, about the mass media in general. Please read each statement and indicate whether you tend generally to agree or disagree with each, or have no opinion.

	AGREE	DISAGREE	NO OPINION
a. News about the Navy is reported in a generally fair and unbiased way.	___	___	___
b. We need aggressive news reporting to insure honesty in government.	___	___	___
c. Performance of the media is so bad that people should insist it improve.	___	___	___
d. Television is doing a good job of reporting the news.	___	___	___
e. Most reporters are trustworthy.	___	___	___

___Defense Dept. press clipping ___Person

___Marines ___Life ___Cher ___Navy, the Department of Defense

___Navy films ___National Geographic

___Naval aviation news ___Naval Institute Proceedings

___Playboy ___TV Guide ___Readers Digest

___Undersea Technology

Please list other such publications you regularly read:

_____ _____

_____ _____

_____ _____

6. How often do you hear a "press briefing"?

___never ___rarely ___often ___daily

7. Here are some statements about television, radio, newspapers and magazines; about the people who are associated with them; and about their content--in other words, about the news media in general. Please read each statement and indicate whether you tend generally to agree or disagree with each, or have no opinion.

	agree	disagree	no opinion
a. News about the Navy is reported in a generally fair and unbiased way.	___	___	___
b. We have aggressive news reporting to insure accuracy in government.	___	___	___
c. Reporters of the media in the end that people should trust it improve.	___	___	___
d. Television is doing a good job of reporting the news.	___	___	___
e. Most reporters are trustworthy.	___	___	___

	AGREE	DISAGREE	NO OPINION
f. Navy news in the newspaper(s) I read is fair and unbiased.	___	___	___
g. There is too much interpretation of the news on television.	___	___	___
h. Newspapers are doing a good job of reporting the news.	___	___	___
i. Navy news on the television news program(s) I regularly watch is fair and unbiased.	___	___	___
j. Newspaper editorials are overly critical of government.	___	___	___
k. Navy news in the news magazine(s) I regularly read is fair and unbiased.	___	___	___

8. Which branch of the armed forces is most favored by the news media? Please rate the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps in order, listing the one you think is <u>most favored</u> as number (1), the second-most favored as number (2), etc.

(1)_____ (2)_____ (3)_____ (4)_____

9. Here are some of the same statements you saw earlier. Please indicate whether or not you think <u>most Navy public affairs officers in Washington</u> would tend generally to agree or disagree with each. (Note: On PAO questionnaire, respondents were asked how "most Navy flag officers in Washington" would answer.)

	AGREE	DISAGREE	NO OPINION
a. News about the Navy is reported in a generally fair and unbiased way.	___	___	___
b. We need aggressive news reporting to insure honesty in government.	___	___	___

			NO

5. Navy news in the newspaper(s) I read is fair and unbiased. ___ ___ ___

9. There is too much interpretation of the news on television. ___ ___ ___

h. Newspapers are doing a good job of reporting the news. ___ ___ ___

i. Navy news on the television news programs(s) I regularly watch is fair and unbiased. ___ ___ ___

j. Newspaper editorials are overly critical of government. ___ ___ ___

k. Navy news in the news magazine(s) I regularly read is fair and unbiased. ___ ___ ___

8. Which branch of the armed forces is most favored by the news media? Please rate the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps in order, listing the one you think is most favored as number (1), the second-most favored as number (2), etc.

(1)_____ (2)_____ (3)_____ (4)_____

9. Here are some of the same statements you saw earlier. Please indicate whether or not you think most Navy public affairs officers in Washington would tend generally to agree or disagree with each. (Note: On the questionnaire, respondents were asked how "most Navy flag officers in Washington" would answer.)

			NO

a. News about the Navy is reported in a generally fair and unbiased way. ___ ___ ___

b. We need aggressive news reporting to insure honesty in government. ___ ___ ___

	AGREE	DISAGREE	NO OPINION
c. Performance of the media is so bad that people should insist it improve.	___	___	___
d. Television is doing a good job of reporting the news.	___	___	___
e. Most reporters are trustworthy.	___	___	___
f. There is too much interpretation of the news on television.	___	___	___
g. Newspapers are doing a good job of reporting the news.	___	___	___
h. Newspaper editorials are overly critical of government.	___	___	___

10. For about how long have you been a flag officer?

____Years

(Note: Not on PAO questionnaire. PAOs were asked, "What is your rank?")

11. Have you ever served in a primary or collateral duty public affairs billet?

___no ___yes If yes, about how long ago?_____

(Note: Not on PAO questionnaire. PAOs were asked, "About how many years have you been a public affairs officer?")

12. What was the source of your commission? ___Naval Academy

___NavCad ___Other (please specify):_____

13. In what area is most of your military experience?

___naval aviation ___surface ships ___submarines

___staff or special duty ___other (please specify):

_____ (Note: Not on PAO questionnaire.)

c. Performance of the media in bad time people should insist it improve.	____	____	____
d. Television is doing a good job of reporting the news.	____	____	____
e. Book reviews are trustworthy.	____	____	____
f. There is too much interpretation of the news on television.	____	____	____
g. Newspapers are doing a good job of reporting the news.	____	____	____
h. Newspaper editorials are overly critical of government.	____	____	____

10. For about how long have you been a city official?

_____Years

(Note: Use on TAG questionnaire. Page were asked, "What is your rank?")

11. Have you ever served in a primary or nonsalaried duty public office?

___no ___yes If yes, about how long ago?_____

(Note: Use on TAG questionnaire. Page were asked, "About how many years have you been a public office holder?")

12. What was the source of your commission? ___Naval Reserve

___Retired ___Other (please specify):_____

13. In what area is most of your military experience?

___Aerial artillery ___Surface ships ___Submarines

___Staff or special duty ___Other (please specify):

_____ (Note: Not on TAG questionnaire.)

14. Please circle the highest year of school completed:

High School				College				Graduate or professional study	
1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2 or more

15. List the degrees you hold:

Degree	Major field
_____	_____
_____	_____

16. What service colleges have you attended?

_____

PLEASE RETURN THIS QUESTIONNAIRE IN THE ENCLOSED ENVELOPE. THANK YOU.

The following space is provided for any comments you wish to make about the news media, Navy public affairs, this survey, etc. Use the back of the page for your comments if needed.

_____

_____

_____

14. Please circle the highest year of school completed.

High School College Graduate or professional study

1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 or more

15. Give the degrees you hold: Degree Major field

_____ _____

_____ _____

16. What service colleges have you attended?

_____

Please address your clarifications in the enclosed envelope.
Thank you.

The following space is provided for any comments you wish to make about the case media, your position after this survey, etc. Use the back of the page for more comments if needed.

_____

_____

_____

APPENDIX B

TEXT OF LETTER TO PROSPECTIVE FLAG OFFICER RESPONDENTS

Dear Admiral _____:

As part of my Navy postgraduate studies, I am trying to determine the news media preferences of Flag officers in the Washington area, and their attitudes toward the media. This research has the approval of the Chief of Information. It will be of considerable benefit to our service if successfully completed, but its value depends entirely on the cooperation given by individual Flag officers.

I solicit about five minutes of your personal time--to fill out the enclosed questionnaire, which is strictly anonymous.

Your help will be greatly appreciated. A post card, also enclosed, will let me know that you are participating.

Thank you.

Very respectfully,

Robert B. Sims
Lieutenant Commander,
U. S. Navy

Dear Admiral _____:

As part of my Navy postgraduate studies, I am trying to determine the news media preferences of Flag officers in the Washington area, and their attitudes toward the media. This research has the approval of the Chief of Information. It will be of considerable benefit to our service if accurately completed, but its value depends entirely on the cooperation given by individual Flag officers.

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Lieutenant Commander,
U. S. Navy

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